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LEAVING MONEY ON THE TABLE
AND PROVIDING AN INCENTIVE
NOT TO PAY-THE STORY OF A
FLAWED COLLECTION DEVICE
T. Keith Fogg*
I. INTRODUCTION
As of September 30, 2007, the IRS had $282-billion of unpaid
assessments on its books.1 Of that amount $58-billion, over 20 percent,
represents the unpaid payroll taxes due from employers. 2 The majority of
payroll taxes due from employers results from income and social security3
taxes collected by the employer and held in trust for the government.
Internal Revenue Code section 6672 ("6672") gives the government the
right to pierce the corporate veil to pursue collection of these payroll taxes.4
. Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Villanova Law School. Thanks to Kate Walker and Barbara
Moyer for exceptionally helpful research assistance. Thanks to Villanova librarians, Matt McGovern
and Amy Spare, for their guidance. Thanks to Professors Les Book of Villanova and Bryan Camp of
Texas Tech for their review and comments.
1. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-617, TAx COMPLIANCE: BUSINESSES OWE
BILLIONS IN FEDERAL PAYROLL TAXES, 7 (2008).

2. Id. at 15; see also Written Testimony of IRS Deputy Commissioner Services and Enforcement
Linda Stiff Before the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs PermanentSubcommittee on
Investigations on the Collection of FederalEmployment Taxes, 8 (2008).
3. The description of the importance of this system which the Solicitor General offered to the
Supreme Court in the brief at pages 9-10 in United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268 (1978), still provides
a good explanation of its importance:
Since 1942, the collection of income taxes by withholding at the source has been an
integral part of the internal revenue laws. As a practical matter, Congress recognized
that many persons found it difficult to pay their tax liabilities at the time they filed
their returns after the close of the taxable year. By requiring withholding of taxes at
the source, Congress sought to prevent the loss of large amounts of revenue that would
not be collected between the receipt of income and the filing of the returns reporting
such income.
Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 9-10, United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268 (1978) (No. 761800).
4. "Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over any tax imposed by this
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Because it creates personal liability, 6672 can serve as a powerful tool in
the fight against the growing tax gap.
Unfortunately, 6672 is flawed in the way it operates due to its position
in the Code as an assessable penalty. The interest charged under 6672 only
runs from the date of the actual assessment against the individual and does
not relate back to the due date of the corporate employment tax return. The
flaw allows those responsible for failing to pay over payroll, and other,5
taxes collected for the government to avoid paying interest for two years or
more. 6 Additionally, the flaw provides an incentive for those responsible to
withhold payment and delay assessment. 7 Those studying the causes of the
IRS tax collection gap uniformly identify the creation of incentives to pay
and removal of delayed collection attempts as keys to successful collection
and reduction of the gap. 8

title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or willfully
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to
other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not
collected, or not accounted for and paid over." I.R.C. § 6672.
5. See Note, The Private Tax Collector - A New Fiduciary, 60 HARV. L. REV. 786 (1946).
Several other types of taxes are withheld from employees or collected by third parties for the
government. Railroad retirement taxes are withheld by the employer. The other types of taxes are
excise taxes imposed based on purchases of goods and services. Two of the best known of the collected
excise taxes are the communications excise tax found in I.R.C. § 4251 that appears on phone bills of
consumers every month and the airline ticket excise taxes found in I.R.C. § 4261. Other collected
excise taxes include the petroleum excise tax in I.R.C. § 4611 and alcohol excise tax in I.R.C. § 5001.
In each of these excise taxes the consumer pays the tax at the time of purchase and the vendor collects
the tax with the requirement to hold the money and pay it over to the government.
6. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-617, TAX COMPLIANCE: BUSINESSES OWE
BILLIONS IN FEDERAL PAYROLL TAXES, 32 (2008). The National Taxpayer Advocate 2006 Annual
Report to Congress highlights the need for early intervention in employment tax cases. It points out
that only 18.9 percent of the 6672 liabilities in fiscal year 2006 were reported as dispositions with full
payment. 2006 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE ANN. REP. vol. 1, at 69.

7. The debate concerning 6672 exemplified by the recent GAO report and the Congressional and
Administrative responses continue to miss the mark on how to use 6672 to improve collection. The
focus of the report and the responses centers on improved IRS collection techniques. No doubt room
for improvement exists but this issue has existed for 50 years or more without focusing on how tax laws
could change to foster the increased compliance desired. This article is the first of two concerning
6672. The second will focus on structural changes to the relationship between the government and the
third parties it uses to collect taxes for it, drawing from effective tax administration principles. Changes
are needed in the information the government provides to insure these third parties understand the
nature of the trust relationship created and the consequence of breaching the trust. Changes are also
needed in the information provided to the government concerning who manages the trust. Instead of
searching for two years or more to "find" the responsible persons, the government should require
businesses to notify it of the individuals responsible. Changes are needed to modernize 6672 as a
penalty in addition to a collection device by drawing from more modern excise tax provisions. Finally,
changes are needed in situations where more than one person is responsible for failure to pay over the
trust funds to incorporate incentives for early payment rather than disincentives.
8. Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third PartiesPlay in Tax Compliance,
60 STAN. L. REV. 695 (2002). See also Dennis J. Ventry, Jr., Cooperative Tax Regulation (American
University Washington College of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2008-47),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1101826; Sagit Leviner, An Overview: A New Era of Tax
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Using the model provided by the tax gap literature, this paper
identifies the source of the problem with 6672 and recommends a solution.
The solution is to remove 6672 from the assessable penalty provisions and
make clear in the statute that interest charges against the individuals
responsible accrue from the due date of the corporate return. To set the
Following that
scene, the article explains the operation of 6672.
explanation, it explores the purpose of 6672 focusing on its legislative
history, Congressional policy, IRS policy, and decisional law. Finally, the
specific problem of the treatment of interest under 6672 is addressed by
examining the mechanics of the interest provisions, the misalignment with
similar statutes and the problems created for the IRS by the current statute.
II. OPERATION OF 6672
Sections 3102(a) and 3402(a) of the Internal Revenue Code (the
"Code") obligates every employer to withhold or collect) from its
employees' wages income and social security taxes. The statutes require
the employers to pay over to the Treasury these collected taxes and section
7501(a) provides that these collected taxes constitute a special trust fund
for the benefit of the United States.1 ° The term "person" used in 7501(a)
means the employer and "person" for this purpose is defined by 7701(a)(1)
to mean an individual, a trust, estate, partnership, association, company or
corporation.
Section 7501(b) provides that persons violating the trust established in
7501(a) bring into play the penalties imposed in 6672 and 7202. Section
7202 provides criminal sanctions for failure to pay over collected taxes in
certain circumstances." I.R.C. 6672 lays out what the code describes as a
Enforcement - From 'Big Stick' to Responsive Regulation (Regulation and Governance Accepted Paper
Series, 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1082247.
9. "The tax imposed by section 3101 shall be collected by the employer of the taxpayer, by
deducting the amount of the tax from the wages as and when paid." I.R.C. § 3102(a). "Except as
otherwise provided in this section, every employer making payment of wages shall deduct and withhold
upon such wages a tax." I.R.C. § 3402(a).
10. "Whenever any person is required to collect or withhold any internal revenue tax from any
other person and to pay over such tax to the United States, the amount of tax so collected or withheld
shall be held to be a special fund in trust for the United States." I.R.C. § 7501(a).
11. This paper does not address criminal sanctions available to the IRS for failure to pay these
taxes. These criminal provisions receive so little use that a citizen of the United States stands a much
greater likelihood of being struck by lightning than being prosecuted under one of these provisions.
http://www.
About 400 people each year are struck by lightening in the United States.
lightningsafety.noaa.gov/medical.htm. Almost no one is prosecuted for the crime described by this
section. See Wilson v. United States, 250 F.2d 312, 314 (9th Cir. 1957) (finding that there "does not
appear to be a single [prior] reported decision involving a felony prosecution for failure to pay
withholding taxes."); United States v. Poll, 521 F.2d 329, 334 n.3 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,429 U.S.
977 (1976) (after citing two other cases of felony prosecution for withholding tax violations, the court
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civil penalty but which acts as a collection device.' 2
Section 6672 is sometimes called the Trust Fund Recovery Penalty
(TFRP) and in other instances the responsible officer penalty or 100
percent penalty. The TFRP label derives from the fact that the taxes
collected by the company constitute a trust for the United States and that
6672 seeks to provide an alternate means of recovering the trust fund when
the company does not pay over the monies held in that trust. This article
will use the term "collected tax" rather than trust fund to describe the taxes
collected by the company and not paid over to the United States. While the
article will focus its discussion on income taxes withheld by employers, the
types of taxes in which the government uses third parties to collect spans a
broad range, 13 making "collected tax" a more appropriate term than simply
"withheld taxes" or "trust fund taxes." Also, the term trust fund tax implies
that a trust exists when, in fact, it often does not because the trust res does
not exist or has not been identified.
The responsible officer penalty label comes from the person to whom
the penalty applies. This article will use the term "responsible officer" to
describe the persons who meet the tests in section 6672 for piercing the
corporate veil and imposing derivative, personal liability. The term
responsible officer penalty will not be used to describe 6672 except as its
use comes from specific case language. Similarly, the term "100 percent
penalty" derives from the imposition of a liability upon responsible officers
equal to 100 percent of the unpaid collected tax. Except for occasions
when use of that term comes from specific case language, this article will
not refer to 6672 with the term 100 percent penalty.
Collection of taxes through withholding operates as an efficient and
effective means of collecting taxes; however, when the business collecting
the taxes has cash flow problems, the collected taxes which the business
should hold in trust for the government become a potential source of
salvation that proves too tempting for some to resist. 14 Typically, the
stated that "[t]o our knowledge these are the sum of the reported prosecutions under 7202 as applied to
withholding taxes.").
12. 6672 serves as a collection device because of the policy adopted by the IRS regarding this
liability. That policy, set out originally in P-5-60, is discussed below in section III.C. However,
taxpayers must be careful to properly account for withholding to ensure the withholding credit they
receive matches the amount of tax owed.
See MauledAgain,
http://mauledagain.
blogspot.com/2008_04_01_archive.html (Apr. 4, 2008, 8:39 EST).
13. The Private Tax Collector,supra note 5, at 786.
14. Numerous articles have been written on the trust fund recovery penalty of 6672. It is also the
single most litigated federal tax issue litigated in the refund context. For a general overview of the
statute see John W. Schmehl & Richard L. Fox, Responsible Person and Lender Liability for Trust Fund
Taxes - §§ 6672 and 3505, 639-2d Tax Mgt. (BNA) A-45 (2000); see also P. Prestin Weidner, Note,
The Misappropriationof Trust Fund Taxes Under the Guise of Reasonable Cause, 57 VAND. L. REV.
287 (2004); Gerald P. Moran, Willfulness: The Inner Sanctum or Unnecessary Element of Section 6672,
11 U. TOL. L. REV. 709, 721-22 n.36 (1980).
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business owner faced with an inability to meet ongoing expenses and a
bank unwilling to extend further credit seeks a "short" term solution by not
paying over to the government the funds it holds or should be holding in
trust.' Unlike other creditors who know the taxpayer's business and who
are generally quick to react to nonpayment, the government responds
slowly to nonpayment. This slowness may encourage the business to
continue the practice of nonpayment of the trust fund taxes in the mistaken
belief that either the business will soon turn around or the government does
not care about the nonpayment. When the government finally arrives to
recover the taxes due to it, the unpaid tax bill for collected taxes has
reached levels the business cannot repay. The business ceases to exist
leaving a large unpaid bill to the government for the taxes it "held" in trust.
It may help in the overall understanding of what happens in these
cases to look at the situation briefly from the government's perspective.
The IRS does not know how much income tax each company withholds
during a specific quarter until the company files its quarterly employment
tax return. With the possible exception of some very large corporations or
corporations with past delinquencies, no one at the IRS monitors the daily,
weekly, monthly or quarterly practices of a particular company with regard
to the payment of the income taxes collected from its employees. If a
company files a tax return and on that return it lists a liability for which it
does not remit payment, the IRS will assess the liability reported on the
return and initiate the collection process. If a company fails to file a return,
the IRS will usually notice that failure within a few months and initiate the
collection process. Even the initiation of the collection process does not
mean that an actual person will make contact with the company for weeks
or months after the collection process begins because correspondence will
16
usually occur first followed afterward by the assignment of a human.
This explanation of the typical process merely shows how a company that
15. As mentioned previously this article does not seek to address whether a particular individual
fits the responsible officer definition. This article presumes that a responsible officer exists and moves
forward from that point. Although the discussion in this section provides background information about
a "typical" situation, numerous reasons for not paying the trust fund taxes exists. Nothing in this article
seeks to portray the individuals held responsible as miscreants or evil doers. Some individuals who do
not pay the trust
fund taxes do so with bad motives knowing that their actions seek to deprive the
government of the trust fund taxes their business has collected. Many times, however, the person who
ends up responsible has a good faith belief that the taxes will eventually be paid and just misjudges the
economics of the situation. Numerous articles exist discussing whether someone meets the statutory
criteria for assessment. See Doreen McCall, Who is a "'Responsible Person" - The Overreaching
Power of the Internal Revenue Service to Collect Employer Withholding Taxes, 18 OHIO N.U. L. REV.
905 (1992); Mary A. Bedikian, The PerniciousReach of 26 U.S.C. Section 6672, 13 VA. TAX REV. 225
(1993) (starting at a different point and concerning only how the liability should attach once the
determination of liability has occurred).
16. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-728, TAX DEBT COLLECTION: IRS HAS A
COMPLEX PROCESS TO ATTEMPT TO COLLECT BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN UNPAID TAX DEBTS, 8-13
(2008) (discussing the collection process).
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has collected taxes for payment over to the IRS could fail to pay the
collected taxes over to the IRS for a reasonable period of time before the
IRS will enter the scene and demand its money. It is easy to contrast the
IRS action with trade creditors and commercial creditors who usually
notice nonpayment much sooner. Consequently, a company experiencing
cash flow problems may naturally tend to keep current with trade and
commercial creditors and delay on payment of the collected taxes.
At this point I.R.C. section 6672 comes into play. Section 6672
allows the IRS to impose a liability, labeled a penalty, equal to the unpaid
collected taxes on those persons who were (a) responsible for the payment
of the collected taxes to the government and (b) willful in their failure to
pay the trust fund taxes over to the government. The IRS may assess more
than one person if more than one person meets the statutory tests. 17 The
IRS policy takes the view that the unpaid trust fund taxes should be
collected only once.1 8 Even though it is possible for several people to be
assessed the 6672 liability, the IRS will usually first attempt to collect from
the entity that incurred the liability.' 9 In circumstances in which the IRS
cannot collect from that entity, it will turn its enforcement mechanisms
toward the responsible officers usually collecting from the responsible
officer who presents that easiest case for collection.2 ° If the IRS collects
full payment from the entity or from one of the responsible officers, then it
will stop and not seek collection further.2 ' If the IRS collects from more
than one responsible officer and collects more than the total liability for
collected taxes, then it will refund the excess to the person(s) from whom it
collected after it received full payment.
17. Brown v. United States, 591 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1979); Turner v. United States, 423 F.2d 448,
449 (9th Cir. 1970); Bowlen v. United States, 956 F.2d 723, 728 (7th Cir. 1992).
18. P-5-14 states: "The withheld employment and income taxes or collected excise taxes will be
collected only once, whether from the business, or from one or more of its responsible persons." I.R.S.
Internal Revenue Manual 1.2.14.1.3 (June 9, 2003). In 2003, the IRS renumbered P-5-60 to P-5-14.
19. I.R.S. Internal Revenue Manual 5.7.4.4 (Apr. 13, 2006), 5.7.3.1 (Oct. 30, 2007).
20. H.R. Rep. 104-506, at 1163 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1143, 1163.
21. I.R.S. Internal Revenue Manual 5.7.7.7.2 (Apr. 13, 2006).
22. I.R.S. Internal Revenue Manual 5.17.7.1.9 (Nov. 2, 2007), 5.7.7.3 (Apr. 13, 2006); IRS Service
Center Advisory 200026024, 2000 WL 33116108 (April 20, 2000). This policy also promotes the same
tactics of running, hiding and delaying, attributed here to the failure to charge interest, when more than
one responsible officer exists. A detailed discussion of the effect of this policy on compliance exceeds
the scope of this article but an example demonstrates why this policy promotes delay. Assume ABC
Corporation withholds $100,000 in income taxes which it fails to pay over to the government. ABC
goes out of business without paying this debt. Bob, Mary and John are the responsible officers of ABC
and on July 1 each are assessed a $100,000 liability based on 6672. Bob fully pays the liability on July
5. Mary fully pays the liability on July 6. John fully pays the liability on July 7. The IRS will keep
Bob's money and refund to Mary and John all of the money that they paid. Since this occurred after the
passage of 6672(d) in 1996, Bob has the right to sue Mary and John for contribution. He will probably
have to bear the cost of that litigation as well as the risk associated with collecting upon any judgment
he obtains. This policy does not entice responsible officers to step forward with payment but rather to
stand back waiting and hoping that one of the others will pay willingly or by enforced collection. For a
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It is not uncommon for the inquiry into the liability under I.R.C.
section 6672 to take several months after the taxes were due and the inquiry
itself lasts several months longer. So by the time the IRS makes an
assessment against a responsible officer, one or two years have passed
since the return for the collected taxes was due and since interest (and
penalties) began accruing on the underlying tax obligation of the entity.

This paper presumes collected taxes went unpaid by the entity and that
one or more persons were responsible for that underpayment. As
mentioned above the tests for who is liable for the 6672 penalty involve
both responsibility and willfulness. Much has been written on these tests
and on other aspects of this liability;24 however, for purposes of the

discussion in this paper, liability exists leaving the question of payment and
more precisely the payment of interest on the obligation.
A. AN EXAMPLE
The example below illustrates the manner in which collection of the
6672 liability is collected in the current system.
ABC, Inc. employs 50 people. It has a quarterly payroll of
$300,000. ABC's management is lead by Bob Smith, President;
Mary Jones, Vice President and John Doe, Treasurer. For the
first quarter of 2008, ABC experienced a sharp dip in orders due
to a recession in the US economy. The dip in orders led to cash
flow problems at ABC. Bob, Mary and John met to discuss the
cash flow problems. They decided that ABC could keep afloat
without incurring significant additional bank debt if it delayed
paying the payroll taxes to the IRS. So, instead of paying the
$75,000 in payroll taxes to the IRS, ABC mailed in its quarterly
Form 941 reporting this amount of liability with no remittance.
The $75,000 in payroll taxes consist of three parts: the employer
liability, withheld social security taxes and withheld income
taxes. For purposes of this example, the withheld income taxes
make up $50,000 of this amount in each of the quarters and the

discussion of the intersection of incentives and tax compliance see Leslie Book, Freakonomicsand the
Tax Gap: An Applied Perspective, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1163 (2007); Leandra Lederman, The Interplay
Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453 (2003).
23. The delay in IRS entry onto the scene is spelled out in detail in U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-08-617, TAX COMPLIANCE: BUSINESSES OwE BILLIONS IN FEDERAL PAYROLL TAXES, 7
(2008). The consequences of the delay are spelled out in 2006 NAT'L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE ANN.
REP. vol. 1, at 69.
24. See DAVID M. RICHARDSON, JEROME BORISON & STEVE JOHNSON, CIVIL TAX PROCEDURE
Ch. 14 (2nd ed. 2008) (2005); MICHAEL 1. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 17.07-09

(Warren Gorham Lamont 1991) (1981); McCall, supra note 16; Bedikian, supra note 16.
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amount of the withheld social security taxes, also a collected tax
subject to 6672, is ignored.
Although ABC's management expected an upturn in the second
quarter that would allow them to catch up with the missed
payment, things only got worse. Consequently, they again
decided not to send into the IRS the payroll tax payment for the
second quarter which again would have totaled $75,000. The
IRS continued not to bother the company. Management knew
things would get better and that in the third quarter, they would
catch up. Unfortunately, orders continued to decline as the year
progressed. ABC was again unable in the third quarter to pay its
payroll taxes of $75,000. Other bills were also being delayed or
being left unpaid. Creditors were calling at an ever increasing
pace. Finally, in late September, ABC heard from the IRS
asking where the payroll taxes were for the first three quarters.
When ABC did not immediately pay the back payroll taxes, the
IRS filed a notice of federal tax lien on September 25, 2008.
The filing of that notice triggered the termination of the
company's line of credit with the bank. Without that line of
credit and with no ability to replace it, ABC could no longer
meet payroll or pay for new goods. ABC closed its doors on
September 30, 2008. At that time, it owed $225,000 in payroll
taxes of which $150,000 stemmed from income taxes that it
withheld from its employees.
In March 2009, having concluded that ABC could not pay the
back payroll taxes, the IRS investigated ABC to determine why
it did not pay its payroll taxes. The IRS determined that the
failure to pay was due to decisions made by John, Mary and
Bob. The IRS asked John, Mary and Bob to consent to the
assessment of the 6672 penalty against them. Each of them told
the IRS that they were not responsible for failing to pay over the
withheld income and social security taxes withheld from the
wages of the employees of ABC and that the problem was a
direct result of decisions made by the other two parties. Each
officer appealed the IRS determination of responsibility to the
Appeals Office. In October 2009 a conference was held in the
IRS appeals office with respect to each of their cases. The
information exchange with the appeals officer and the time it
took him to reach a conclusion meant that the decision to hold
Bob, Mary and John liable under I.R.C. section 6672 came in
February, 2010. The assessment against each of them for
$150,000 was made on April 30, 2010, two years after the due
date of the return for the first quarter for which the withheld
payroll taxes were not paid.

Vol. 5:1
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B. INTEREST ANALYSIS

Interest begins running on each of Bob, Mary and John's 6672
liabilities on April 30, 2010, the day of the assessment of the 6672 liability.
The liability of ABC for these employment taxes arose on the payment of
the employee wages. A failure to deposit penalty could be imposed against
ABC beginning on the due date of the payment of the employment tax.
That due date depends on the amount of the payroll. The due date of the
return for each quarter marks the day on which interest begins to run
against ABC on the outstanding employment taxes. The quarterly return is
due on the last day of the month following the end of the quarter. For the
quarter ending March 31, 2008, the liability for interest began running on
April 30, 2008.
For purposes of this illustration, the amount of interest reflects only
interest on the withheld income tax portion of the employment tax liability.
Interest on $50,000 from April 30, 2008 to April 30, 2010, at the applicable
rate (using 5 percent simple interest for all quarters) would be $5000.25
Interest on the liability for the second quarter would run from July 31, 2008
and at the applicable rate would be $4380. Interest on the liability for the
third quarter would run from October 31, 2008 at the applicable rate would
be $3760. The total amount of interest due from ABC on the employment
tax liabilities for these three quarters as of April 30, 2010, would be
$13,140. As of April 30, 2010, Bob, Mary and John owe $0 in interest for
the employment tax liabilities assessed against them with respect to the first
three quarters of 2008 because the 6672 liability is treated as an assessable
penalty for which interest does not begin until the liability is assessed.

25. The current interest rate does not use simple interest but interest that compounds daily so, if the
assumed interest rate is correct, the total interest in a real case would, of course, be higher. I.R.C. §
6622(a).

Vol. 5:1
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The tax and interest liabilities in chart form are as follows:
Period

1st Q 2008

2nd Q 2008
3rd Q 2008
Total

Unpaid
Employment
Taxes

Withheld Income
Tax Portion of
Employment
Taxes

$75,000
$75,000
$75,000

$50,000
$50,000
$50,000

$225,00026

$150,00021

Interest on
Withheld Tax,
Due Date of
Return to
Assessment of
6672 Liability
$5,000
$4,380
$3,760
$13,140"

As is seen in this example, the savings to the responsible officers
resulting from the delay equals $13,140. The current system not only
causes the Treasury to forego revenue for the time value of money on the
unpaid taxes. It also makes the administration of the laws much more
difficult because the IRS must use its investigative powers to identify the
individuals responsible for the failure to pay the employment taxes while
those individuals do little to work with the IRS to resolve the matter.29
Instead, they will do everything in their power to avoid resolving the matter
since resolution not only means they have been tagged with the liability but
also that the liability no longer exists in an interest-free setting.

26. Total unpaid employment taxes due from ABC.
27. Total amount of unpaid employment taxes due from ABC that represents collected taxes. This
is the amount for which responsible persons may be held liable pursuant to I.R.C. § 6672.
28. Total interest owed on the unpaid collected taxes between date the liability arose - the due
dates of the employment tax returns - and the date of the responsible officer assessments - April 30,
2010. This amount represents the amount owed by the entity for failing to pay over the collected taxes
that is not charged under current federal law to the responsible officers because the liability of
responsible officers for interest does not start until the date of the 6672 assessment while the liability of
the entity for interest runs from the due date of the return.
This chart does not display other liabilities that would be due from the corporation that are not
charged to the individual responsible officers under existing federal law but are charged to the
individual responsible officers under the laws of most states. These liabilities are the failure to deposit
penalty and the failure to pay penalty. The failure to deposit penalty arises under I.R.C. § 6656(a). The
failure to pay penalty arrives under I.R.C. § 6651(a)(2). In the aggregate these penalties would almost
always exceed the amount of unpaid interest.
29. As seen below, in the section discussing state laws on this issue, the administration of this issue
by the IRS will also prove more difficult in most states if the taxpayer or the taxpayer's representative is
well informed since the first payments will go to the state to stop the running of interest and penalties
there rather than to the IRS.
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III. PURPOSE OF 6672
The legislative history of 6672 traces back to a penal statute. The
penal nature displays itself in both civil and criminal manifestations. This
history supports a reasonable inference that 6672's location in the 1954
Code in the assessable penalty provisions followed, or at least did not
contradict, the purpose of the statute as developed in the decades prior to
codification. In contrast to the legislative history, the purpose of 6672 as
expressed in Congressional policy, in IRS policy and in court decisions is
simply that 6672 serves as a backup mechanism for insuring payment of
collected taxes. Furthermore, the Congressional, IRS and court expressions
on the policy of 6672 make clear that this statute does not create a separate
liability.
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Penal provisions imposing criminal liability for failure to pay over
collected taxes were created in the Corporate Excise Tax Act of 1909.' °
Section 6672's history flows though the Revenue Act of 1916 shortly after
the establishment of the modem tax system following the passage of the
16th Amendment. 3 Like many tax provisions it traces this part of its
history directly to a war-in this case World War I. Congress passed a
criminal penalty which applied to violations relating to the failure to pay of
certain excise taxes.32 At that time withholding of income taxes did not
exist and excise taxes provided a substantial portion of the total federal tax
revenues. Because this segment of 6672's history manifests itself as a
criminal provision, interest did not come into play. The statute provided:
That whoever fails to make any return required... or who makes
any false or fraudulent return, and whoever evades, or attempts to
evade any tax... or fails to collect or truly to account for and pay
over any such tax, shall be subject to a penalty of not more than
$1,000, or to imprisonment for not more than one year or both, at
the discretion of the court, and in addition thereto a penalty of
double the tax evaded, or not collected, or accounted for and paid

30. "That if any cosigner, seller.., or other person... shall be guilty of any willful act or
omission by means whereof the United States shall or may be deprived of the lawful duties, or any
portion thereof, accruing upon the merchandise.., such person or persons shall, upon conviction, be
fined for each offense.., or be imprisoned ... or both ....
Corporate Excise Tax Act of 1909, Pub.
L. No. 5, § 9, 36 Stat. 11,97 (1909).
31. Act of Sept. 8, 1916, Pub. L. No. 271, ch. 463, § 16, 39 Stat. 756, 773-75. For a detailed
discussion of the legislative history of 6672 see Moran, supra note 14, at 723-53.
32. Act of Sept 8, 1916, Pub. L. No. 271, §§ 200, 300, 400 and 500, 39 Stat. 756, 777-93.
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over, to be assessed and collected in the same manner as taxes are
assessed and collected in any case in which the punishment is not
otherwise specifically provided.33

In the Revenue Act of 1918, Congress enacted section 1308 creating
three tiers of civil and criminal penalties applicable to non compliance with
excise taxes.34 The first tier, the civil tier, provided for a monetary penalty
of up to $1,000. The statute does not specifically tie the penalty to an
amount of unpaid tax and in that respect looks more like a "regular"
penalty. 35 The second tier began the criminal sanctions by creating a
misdemeanor liability. 36 The third tier most closely resembles the current
6672 except that this third tier imposed a criminal liability. It hit the
offending party with a "penalty of the amount of the tax evaded, or not
paid, collected or accounted for and paid over ....,37
The Revenue Act of 1924 made further changes. 38 The changes
continued to move the language toward the current language and "[e]xcept
for the minor phrase reversal from 'any person who willfully fails' of the
1924 Revenue Act to 'any person required to collect,.. . who willfully fails
to collect' of present section 6672, the Revenue Act of 1924 represents the
last substantive amendment to the language of what became section
6672." 39

In 1935, the passage of the Social Security Act expanded the scope of
the penalty for failure to pay collected taxes making it applicable to unpaid
40
Social Security taxes collected at the source in addition to excise taxes.
33. Act of Oct. 3, 1917, ch. 63, § 1004, 40 Stat. 300, 325-26.
34. Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 254, ch. 18, § 1308(c), 40 Stat. 1057, 1143.
35. Id. ("That any person required under Titles V, VI, VII, VII, IX, X, or XI1, to pay, or to collect,
account for and pay over any tax, or required by law or regulations made under authority thereof to
make a return or supply any information for the purposes of the computation, assessment or collection
of any such tax, who fails to pay, collect, or truly account for and pay over any such tax, make any such
return or supply any such information at the time or times required by law or regulation shall in addition
to other penalties provided by law be subject to a penalty of not more than $ 1,000.").
36. Id.
37. Id. The statute also contains a definitional provision similar to current section 6672 - "The
term person as used in this section includes an officer or employee of a corporation or a member or
employee of a partnership, who as such officer, employee, or member is under a duty to perform the act
in respect of which the violation occurs." Id.
38. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 176, ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253.
39. Moran, supra note 14, at 740-41. See also Revenue Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 562, ch. 852, §
146, 45 Stat. 791, 835; see also Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 176, ch. 234, § 1017(d), 43 Stat. 253,
344. Section 1017(d) provides: "Any person who willfully fails to pay, collect or truthfully account for
and pay over, any tax imposed by Titles IV, V, VI, VII, and VIIi, or willfully attempts in any manner to
evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by
law, be liable to a penalty of the amount of the tax evaded, or not paid, collected or accounted for and
paid over, to be assessed and collected in the same manner as taxes are assessed and collected."
40. Act of Aug. 14, 1935, Pub. L. No. 271, ch.531, § 807(c), 49 Stat. 620, 638 (stating: "All
provisions of law, including penalties, applicable with respect to any tax imposed by section 600 [excise
tax provisions] ... of the Revenue Act of 1926,... shall, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with
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This penalty was codified in 1939 and "remained intimately and
exclusively related to the criminal sanctions until its 'civil' pigeonholing in
the 1954 Code. '41
In the same year it passed the Social Security Act, 1935, Congress
brought into the Internal Revenue Code the predecessor of current section
7501. 42 Section 7501 provides that "the amount of tax so collected or
withheld shall be held to be a special fund in trust for the United States."
The goal behind the statute centered on a desire to make administrative
assessment and collection provisions available and to provide further
protection for the collected funds.43
Just as World War I caused Congress to create the criminal penalty
predecessor of 6672, World War II inspired another change which
significantly impacted the penalty for failure to pay over collected taxes.
The Current Tax Payment Act of 1943 created the regime of tax collection
from employees that still exists today.44 Congress once again grafted the
withholding tax provisions into the penalty regime initially set up for excise
taxes expanding this collected tax penalty provision to reach essentially the
same provisions it currently covers.4 5
The next act in the progression of the collected tax penalty to its
modem provision occurred in the codification effort in 1954.46 In this
effort the penalty for collected taxes moved into Subtitle F, subpart BAssessable Penalties of the newly revised Internal Revenue Code.4 7 The
legislative history of 6672 contains basically no explanation concerning the
placement of the civil liability creating personal liability for failure to pay
collected taxes in the assessable penalty section of the newly revised
Code.48 The positioning of 6672 in the assessable penalty subpart of the
the provisions of this title, be applicable with respect to the taxes imposed by this title.").
41. Moran, supra note 14, at 747.
42. Revenue Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 216, ch. 277, § 607,48 Stat. 680, 768.
43. S. REP. No. 73-558, at 53 (1934). The Supreme Court interpreted the scope of this trust and
detailed the history behind the creation of the provision in Begier v. Internal Revenue Service, 496 U.S.
53(1990).
44. Current Tax Payment Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 68, ch. 120, 57 Stat. 126.
45. Moran, supra note 14, at 748 n.138. As noted in Professor Moran's article at footnote 138, no
judicial interpretation of the penalty for collected taxes had yet occurred.
46. See Regan & Co., Inc. v. United States, 290 F.Supp. 470, 479-80 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) for a
discussion of the broad scope of 6672 as it tied together more narrowly crafted statutes imposing similar
liabilities in piecemeal fashion.
47. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 591, 68A Stat. 3, 828. At the same time section
7202 was enacted in Subtitle F, subpart A--crimes creating a criminal liability for similar conduct but
with penalty provisions that did not incorporate the 100 percent liability for the unpaid tax. Id. at 851;
see also Moran, supra note 14, at 750.
48. Moran, supra note 14, at 750; H.R. REP. No. 83-1337 (1954), as reprinted in, 1954
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4025 ("This revision includes a rearrangement of the provisions to place them in
more logical sequence, the deletion of obsolete material, and an attempt to express the internal revenue
laws in a more understandable manner.").
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Code together with the absence of any specific language in 6672
concerning interest has led to the current state of affairs in which interest
does not accrue until the liability is assessed. None of the changes to 6672
since 1954 have addressed the issue of interest. Its placement within
subpart B of Subtitle F has remained unchanged.
Assessable penalties generally exist separate from taxes imposed
under the Internal Revenue Code. Because these penalties do not relate to
a specific tax, they do not relate back to a specific return due date or
taxable event.4 9 Assessable penalties generally stand alone as their own
separate liability with the exception of 6672. Consequently, a separate
interest provision imposes interest from the time these penalties arise-at
the time of their assessment.50
B. CONGRESSIONAL POLICY

The expression of Congressional policy concerning 6672 discussed
here will focus on the bankruptcy provisions concerning the liability for
collected taxes. Congressional policy expressed through the Bankruptcy
Code demonstrates that almost no liability shares the importance of
collected taxes.
Creditors in bankruptcy cases basically belong to one of two groups:
secured or unsecured. Generally, secured creditors who do not sleep on
their rights have little concern about bankruptcy because they look to their
security rather than the debtor's solvency for repayment. Unsecured
creditors, however, have much to fear from bankruptcy since so many
debtors have little or no unencumbered assets with which to repay their
unsecured debts. Congressional policy addresses the plight of the
unsecured creditors by making some of them more equal than others. The
provisions that differentiate unsecured creditors come in two forms:
priority status and exceptions to discharge.
Bankruptcy Code section 507(a) sets forth a list of unsecured creditors
that Congress has designated as entitled to payment before other unsecured
creditors. Placement of an unsecured creditor on this list significantly
improves its chances of receiving payment through the bankruptcy
proceeding. The higher on the list created by 507(a) an unsecured creditor
achieves, the more likely it will receive payment.
49. IRS Chief Counsel Advice 200112003, 2001 WL 283666 (Nov. 28, 2000); Sage v. United
States, 908 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1990).
50. I.R.C. § 6601(e)(2) provides that interest is only imposed on an assessable penalty if the person
assessed such penalty fails to pay the liability after receiving notice and demand.
51. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, Ch. 507.2 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th ed.
2008); MICHAEL HERBERT, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY, Ch. 10.04 (Bender 2000).
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In a similar manner, Bankruptcy Code section 523(a) creates a list of
unsecured creditors whose debts Congress has determined receive an
exception to discharge. Creditors on this list may continue to seek
collection from individual debtors even after the individual debtor has
obtained a discharge from the bankruptcy court.52 Every unsecured
creditor wants recognition on this list because the "next best thing" to
receiving payment through the bankruptcy estate is having the continued
ability to pursue collection after discharge. Some unsecured creditors have
sufficient fortune or influence to have their debt recognized as both a
priority debt and one excepted from discharge. 3
With the exception of the liability imposed by 6672, assessable tax
penalties do not make the priority list in Bankruptcy Code section 507(a). 4
An unsecured claim for an assessable penalty receives general unsecured
classification rather than receiving any priority. Assessable penalties and
tax penalties in general receive even worse treatment than a general
unsecured classification for cases administered under Chapter 7.55 In
Chapter 7 cases, these penalties only receive payment after all general
unsecured claims have been paid. 6
This sub-general unsecured
classification even applies to penalty claims for which a notice of federal
tax lien was filed and would, except for their origin in the penalty
provisions, receive secured status. 7
Although assessable penalties do not receive priority claim
classification, they do receive an exception to discharge pursuant to B.C.
523(a)(7).58 To qualify for an exception to discharge, an assessable penalty
52. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, Ch. 523.01; DAVID EPSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY AND RELATED LAW IN
ANUTSHELL, Ch. XVII, Sec. B (West 2005) (2002).
53. Letter from David Lindsay, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, to Emanuel Celler,
Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary (June 24, 1959), in H.R. REP. No. 86-735, at 6
(1959); Letter from Stanley Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, to Emanuel Celler, Chairman
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (July 14, 1961), in S. REP. No. 89-114, at 7 (1965); Letter
from Stanley Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, to James Eastland, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary (Aug. 24, 1961), in S. REp. No. 89-114, at 10.
54. 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(8)(C) (West 2004) provides priority status for collected taxes, "a tax
required to be collected or withheld and for which the debtor is liable in whatever capacity." This
discussion focuses on federal tax liability; however, essentially the same results would occur with
respect to state tax liabilities. Subsequent references to "B.C." refer to the Bankruptcy Code as enacted
in Title II of the United States Code.
55. 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 726(a)(4), 724(a) (West 2004).
56. 11 U.S.C.A. § 726(a)(4).
57. 11 U.S.C.A. § 724(a) (West 2004).
58. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(1)(A) (West 2004) provides an exception to discharge for collected taxes
because collected taxes receive priority treatment pursuant to B.C. 507. Because assessable penalties,
other than 6672, do not receive priority treatment pursuant to B.C. 507, they do not meet the test of B.C.
523(a)(1)(A). They also do not meet the tests of B.C. 523(a)(l)(B) or (C). Assessable penalties do
meet the test of B.C. 523(a)(7). Only one reported decision specifically addresses the application of the
exception to discharge to assessable penalties other than 6672. This decision was subsequently
withdrawn. Nielsen v. United States, No. 3-88-3164-H, 1991 WL 101552 (N.D. Tex. Apr 19, 1991),
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must relate to an act or a return due date that occurred within three years
before the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The exception to discharge that
applies to assessable penalties arises under a different subparagraph than
the exception to discharge applicable to 6672. The exception to discharge
applicable to 6672 is much preferred because of the lack of a time
limitation.
As further discussed below, the treatment of the liability imposed by
6672 is not only different and more favorable than the treatment of other
assessable penalties; it is more favorable than the treatment of almost any
other unsecured liability. This special treatment appears to result from
Congressional recognition of the importance of the payment of collected
taxes.59
A debate concerning the treatment of 6672 in bankruptcy occurred in
the late 1950s and early 1960s when proposals were pending in Congress to
reform the discharge provisions to reduce or eliminate the broad exception
to discharge then available to taxes.6 ° In 1961, Assistant Secretary of the
Treasury Stanley S. Surrey wrote to Senator Eastland, the Chairman of the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary: "Delinquency in this area has increased
in recent years, and the Department considers it most undesirable to permit
persons who are charged with the responsibility of paying over to the
Federal Government moneys collected from third persons to be relieved of
their obligations in bankruptcy when they have converted such moneys for
their own use.'
In 1966 Congress did scale back the discharge exception previously
granted for taxes but added subsection (e) to Section 17a(1) of the
Bankruptcy Act.62 Prior to the 1966 amendments, all taxes basically
benefited from the exception to discharge in bankruptcy. This broad
exception provoked significant complaints from the bankruptcy bar and
certain commercial interests. With the passage of the amendments in 1966,
the exception to discharge for taxes took on a form similar to that carried
into the current Bankruptcy Code, that is, the exception primarily applies to

withdrawn, Nielson v. United States, No. 3-88-3164-H, 1991 WL 107412 (N.D. Tex. May 09, 1991);
I.R.S. Litigation Guideline Mem. GL-36, Effect of Bankruptcy Case upon I.R.C. 6700, 6701, 6702, and
7408 (Apr. 24, 1998).
59. S.REP. No. 95-989, at 14 (1978).
60. Letter from David Lindsay, Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury, to Emanuel Celler,
Chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary (June 24, 1959), in H.R. REP. No. 86-735, at 6
(1959); Letter from Stanley Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, to Emanuel Celler, Chairman
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (July 14, 1961), in S. REp. No. 89-114, at 7 (1965); Letter
from Stanley Surrey, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, to James Eastland, Chairman of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary (Aug. 24, 1961), in S. REP. No. 89-114, at 10; H.R. 2236, 86th Cong.
(1959); S. 976, 89th Cong. (1965).
61. S.REP.No.89-114, at 10. See also H.R. REp. No.88-372, at 6 (1963).
62. S.REP. No.89-114, at 16-18
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taxes incurred within three years of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 63
A new section 17a(1)(e) provided: "That a discharge in bankruptcy
shall not release a bankrupt from any taxes... , which the bankrupt has
collected or withheld from others as required by the laws of the United
States... but has not paid over. .. ."64 As the House Committee explained
in reporting out the measure, the purpose of the amendment was "to exempt
from the provisions of this bill taxes which the bankrupt has collected or
withheld from others under Federal or State law." 5 In the House
Committee's view, "[t]he objection of Treasury to the discharge of socalled trust fund taxes has been met by the amendment to this bill. 66
Likewise, the Senate Reports confirm that the purpose of Section
17a(1)(e)
67
was to render trust fund taxes nondischargeable in bankruptcy.
In the 1970s Congress spent several years creating a new bankruptcy
code to replace the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.68 In creating the new
bankruptcy code, Congress reviewed, inter alia, the types of unsecured
debts that should receive priority status and that should receive an
exception to discharge.6 9 Ultimately, the type of debt it singled out for an
exception to discharge in 1966, collected and withheld taxes including the
6672 liability, received special recognition in the new bankruptcy code as a
priority tax claim and as a claim excepted from discharge. 70 Not only did
6672 receive priority status under the bankruptcy code enacted in 1978
when no other assessable penalty achieved such status, the liability
imposed under 6672, and for any unpaid collected tax, also received better
treatment under the bankruptcy code than any other tax of any type.7 1
A taxpayer entering bankruptcy with unpaid income, employment or
excise taxes, other than taxes of those types collected from others,
essentially has a time limit cap on the life of that liability before it loses its

63. H.R. 3438, 89th Cong., 80 Stat. 270 (1966).
64. Pub. L. No. 89-496, 80 Stat. 270.
65. H.R. REP. No. 88-372, at 1.
66. Id. at 5.
67. S. REP. No. 88-1134, at 1, 6 (1964); S. REP. No. 89-114, at 6 (1965); Brief of PetitionerAppellant at 17-18, United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268 (1978) (No. 76-1800).
68. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 1-4 (1978).
69. Congress created a commission to review the bankruptcy laws and make recommendations.
S.J. Res. 88, 91st Cong., 84 Stat. 468 (1970). That commission's initial recommendation concerning
taxes proposed a very limited exception to discharge for taxes including collected taxes. "The principal
revisions are, first, the reduction from three years to one year of the time period for the
nondischargeability and priority of tax debts, and, second, the shift from reference to 'due and owing'
and 'assessed' to special rules tailored to major categories of the debts." H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, pt. 2,
at 138 (1973).
70. S. REP. No. 95-989, at 14 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 191 (1977).
71. Basically, all other prepetition unsecured taxes received a time limited grant of priority status
and a time limited exception to discharge. See II U.S.C.A. §§ 507(a)(8), 523(a)(1) (West 2004 &
Supp.2008).
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status as an unsecured priority claim.72 The time limit essentially makes
income, employment or excise taxes older than three years at the time of
the bankruptcy petition, general unsecured claims rather than claims
entitled to unsecured priority status. Contrast that with the treatment of the
6672 liability and the liability for unpaid collected taxes. A taxpayer
entering bankruptcy with unpaid 6672 liabilities has a liability that will
receive unsecured priority status no matter how old the 6672 liability is at
the time of the bankruptcy petition.
Granting the 6672 liability unsecured priority status no matter its age
provides significant recognition of the importance of this liability from
Congress' viewpoint. Priority status gives the government a much greater
chance to receive payment on this liability from the bankruptcy estate that
it would have as a general unsecured claim. The unlimited time period for
priority status also means that the 6672 liability will always receive the
exception to discharge under B.C. 523(a)(1) while other taxes lose their
exception to discharge with age. The combination essentially makes it
impossible to get rid of the 6672 liability through bankruptcy. This total
protection from bankruptcy evinces a significant policy statement by
Congress concerning the importance of this liability. No other tax and
almost no other liability receive this type of protection.
In 2005 Congress addressed the protection for the 6672 liability again
in order to close a loophole that had arisen through case law. The change
in 2005 once again demonstrated Congress' view of the importance of this
type of liability. The change occurred in the discharge provisions of
Chapter 13. Persons liable under 6672 are not always known to the IRS
at the time they file a bankruptcy petition because the liability is a
derivative liability. Generally, the IRS does not know who has liability
under 6672 until it investigates a company after it has failed to pay over the
collected taxes. Because the identity of the debtor as a responsible officer
is not known by the IRS prior to the bar date, it fails to file a timely proof
of claim. The failure to file a timely proof of claim does not affect the
exception to discharge in Chapter 7 and 11 cases of individuals because the
exception ties itself to the status of the IRS claim and not whether the IRS
timely filed such a claim.
The IRS argued for a similar result in Chapter 13 but lost that
argument in Tomlan v. United States.74 The IRS failed to timely file its

72. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(8)(A) for income taxes; section (D) for employment taxes; and
section (E) for excise taxes. II U.S.C.A. §§507(a)(8)(A), (D), (E) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008). With
respect to each type of tax the time limit is generally three years from the due date of the return or the
event giving rise to the tax liability.
73. II U.S.C.A. § 1328(a) (West Supp. 2008); H.R. REP. No. 109-3 1, at 101 (2005).
74. Tomlan v. United States (In re Tomlan), 102 B.R. 790 (E.D. Wash. 1989), aff'd per curiam,
907 F.2d 114 (9th Cir. 1990).
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claim in Tomlan. The debtor's plan proposed to pay in full all timely filed
priority claims. The District Court found that the plan discharged the
debtor's liability under 6672 because of the finality of the plan and the
wording of B.C. 1328(a).75 The IRS essentially acquiesced in the decision
in the publication of its litigation position on the issue; 76 however, it sought
to change 1328(a) when Congress appointed a Commission in 1994 to look
into changes to the bankruptcy code. 7 When Congress ultimately passed
the laws resulting primarily from the proposals of the Commission in the
2005, those bankruptcy amendments included a provision addressing this
concern of the IRS. The result of this process is a change to 1328(a) that
prevents discharge of the liability imposed under 6672 in a Chapter 13,
whether or not the IRS files a timely claim.
Congressional policy toward 6672 as expressed in bankruptcy code
provisions from 1966 to 2005 could not more strongly suggest how
important Congress views the requirement to pay the collected taxes and
how different 6672 is from any other assessable penalty. Its difference
comes from its status as an alternate means for the government to collect
those taxes which have been collected for it and which should be held in
trust and paid over to the government.
C. IRS POLICY
The principal IRS position concerning 6672 comes in policy statement
P-5-14. 79 This policy statement currently provides that "[t]he withheld
employment and income taxes or collected excise taxes will be collected
only once, whether from the business, or from one or more of its
responsible persons., 80 This policy statement goes back to 1956. 81 The
Supreme Court has cited to the policy statement 82 and to a Comptroller
General Opinion based on this policy statement in describing the purpose
of 6672.83
75. In re Tomlan, 102 B.R. at 796.
76. I.R.S. Litigation Guideline Mem. GL-37, Dischargeability of Untimely Filed Liabilities in
Chapter 13 Bankruptcies (Apr. 7, 1992) (obsoleted Jan. 13, 1998).
77. Jack Williams, A Comment on the Tax Provisions of the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission Report: The Good, The Bad and the Ugly, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 445, 455 (1997).
78. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 § 707, 119 Stat. 23, 126;
11 U.S.C.A. § 1328(a) (West Supp. 2008).
79. Policy Statement P-5-14 was renumbered and slightly rewritten in 2003. Prior to that it was
Policy Statement P-5-60.
80. I.R.M. 1.2.14.1.3 (June 9, 2003).
81. I.R.S. Policy Statement P-5-60, MT 1218-56 (Approved Nov. 5, 1956); see McCarty v. United
States, 437 F.2d 961 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (discussing related Internal Memorandum No. 56-46).
82. Slodov v. United States, 436 U.S. 238, 245-46 (1978).
83. United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 280 n.12 (1978).
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The policy of the IRS regarding 6672 has remained constant for over
fifty years.84 The IRS imposes the 6672 liability against all of the persons
responsible for the failure to pay a collected tax. Consequently, it may
have assessments on its books for the original liability due from a
corporation plus one or more assessments of the amount of the unpaid
collected taxes against persons responsible for the corporation's failure to
pay those collected taxes over to the IRS. Despite having numerous
assessments and despite the apparent ability under 6672 to collect the full
amount from each party, the IRS has consistently said that it will not use
6672 as a mechanism for collecting the full amount of the unpaid collected
taxes from each party assessed. Rather, it takes the view that 6672 is
simply a device for the collection of the unpaid taxes collected by the
corporation. It is not a separate liability. As such, the IRS seeks to collect
85
only once from either the corporation or any of the responsible persons.
Using the example of Bob, Mary, and John as responsible officers of
ABC for three quarters of 2008 for a total of $150,000 in unpaid collected
taxes, an illustration is possible. Once the IRS makes the responsible
officer assessments against Bob, Mary and John it will have four
assessments on its books for the recovery of this same $150,000. Because
of the policy statement, the IRS links these four accounts in order to insure
that it only collects $150,000 in tax (plus any applicable penalties and
interest). 86 This policy leads to the IRS position on repayment of proceeds
received in excess of one full payment of the tax. If Bob, Mary and John
are each assessed a $150,000 6672 liability on March 10, 2010, each owes
$150,000 at that moment. Suppose Bob pays the $150,000 that day at
10:00 a.m., Mary pays the $150,000 at 11:00 a.m. and John pays the
$150,000 at noon. After a thorough investigation to ascertain when the
payments were received, the IRS would refund to Mary and John their
entire payments leaving Bob as the person who paid it all. 87 If Bob wishes
to have Mary and John contribute to 6672 liability, he must bring a separate
suit against each of them for that purpose, obtain a judgment and
successfully collect on the judgment.8 8
The IRS policy toward 6672 does not match its policy with respect to
any of the other assessable penalties. For all other assessable penalties, the
IRS seeks to collect the total amount of the taxes assessed. Unlike 6672,
84. I.R.S. Service Center Advisory, 2000 WL 33116108 (June 30, 2000).
85. See Bryan T. Camp, Avoiding the Ex Post Facto Slippery Slope of Deer Park, 3 AM. BANKR.

INST. L. REv. 329, 330-32 (1995) for a general discussion of the nature of the 6672 liability and how
the IRS seeks to collect it.
86. I.R.S. Service Center Advisory, 2000 WL 33116108 (June 30, 2000).
87. The SCA covers the repayment to taxpayers from the IRS but does not mention what happens
between parties when only one pays. Suing other parties to recover a party's share of the liability is
included in IRC §6672(d).
88. Id.
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the other assessable penalties are separate and distinct from any taxes to
which they may relate. The other assessable penalties perform a penal
function rather than a function to recover unpaid taxes.
D. COURT DECISIONS
Two court decisions provide significant insight into the view courts
take toward 6672. These decisions adopt the IRS policy that 6672 exists as
a collection device and, in one, reinforce the Congressional policy view
concerning the importance of 6672.
89
1. United States v. Sotelo

Arising in bankruptcy, Sotelo presented the Supreme Court with the
opportunity to consider the nature and purpose of 6672.Mr. Sotelo filed his
bankruptcy petition in 1973 when the Bankruptcy Act (rather than the
current Bankruptcy Code) was in effect. He initially contested the
determination that he owed the government pursuant to 6672; however, he
did not appeal the determination that he was liable. Instead, he shifted his
argument to one based on discharge arguing that the Bankruptcy Act
17a(1)(e) discharged penalties imposed under 6672. Although he lost at
the bankruptcy court and district court level, he prevailed on this argument
before the Seventh Circuit. 90
First, Mr. Sotelo argued that "the liability described in 6672 itself as a
'penalty' and as such had been discharged in bankruptcy." 9 Second, he
argued that section 17a(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy Act did not except from
discharge the penalty imposed under 6672 but rather excepted from
discharge only the liability for collected taxes due from the corporation that
incurred the debt.92
The Supreme Court examined both the history of the 1966
amendments to the Bankruptcy Act as well as the purpose of 6672 as it
related to the 1966 amendments. Through that examination it determined
that the Mr. Sotelo's 6672 liability93
was excepted from discharge by section
17a(1)(e) of the Bankruptcy Act. It further determined that the penalty
89. United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268 (1978).
90. In re Sotelo, 551 F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1977).
91. Sotelo, 436 U.S. at 271; Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 5, United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S.
268 (1978) (No. 76-1800).
92. Brief for the Respondent, supra note 91, at 8.
93. "The fact that respondent was found liable under 6672 necessarily means that he was 'required
to collect, truthfully account for, and pay over' the withholding taxes, and that he willfully failed to
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label placed on 6672 by the Internal Revenue Code did not matter when the
94
Court analyzed the language and purpose of Bankruptcy Act 17a(l)(3).
Through this analysis, the Court determined that 6672 acted as a device for
collecting the types of taxes described in 17a(l)(e).95 As such, simply
seeking to label 6672 as a penalty did not advance the taxpayer's argument
because the label did not control the true purpose of 6672 as it related to the
discharge provisions in Bankruptcy Act 17a(1)(e).96
The Court did not explicitly say that 6672 is not a penalty. Instead, it
focused on how 6672 operated with respect to the language of the
discharge provision. In doing so, the Court did quote from a letter prepared
in 1976 by the Comptroller General concerning IRS practices with regard
to 6672; "IRS uses the 100-percent penalty only when all other means of
securing the delinquent taxes have been exhausted. It is generally used
against responsible officials of corporations that have gone out of
business .... [I]t is IRS policy that the amount of the tax will be collected
only once. After the tax liability is satisfied, no collection action is taken
on the remaining 100-percent penalties. 97
The dissent in this 5-4 decision disagreed strongly that the "taxes"
excepted from discharge in Bankruptcy Act 17a(1)(e) equated to the
"penalty" imposed by 6672.98 The dissent pointed to the legislative history
of 6672 in support of the penal underpinnings of the statute. 99 The harsh
result that the majority opinion created for the individual business owner by
holding the 6672 liability as an exception to discharge was cited as support
for the wrong policy direction taken by the majority. In stark terms 1 °° the
dissent described the same bankruptcy result, made much clearer in the
legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code that is described above in
Section 3.B. While the dissent expresses its significant concerns that
meet one or more of these obligations." Sotelo, 436 U.S. at 274. "It is therefore clear that the 6672
liability was not imposed for a failure on the part of respondent to collect taxes but was rather imposed
for his failure to pay over taxes that he was required both to collect and to pay over. Under these
circumstances, the most natural reading of the statutory language leads to the conclusion that
respondent 'collected or withheld' the taxes within the meaning of Bankruptcy Act 17a(l)(e)." Id. at
275.
94. "The funds here involved were unquestionable 'taxes' at the time they were 'collected or
withheld from others.' ... That the funds due are referred to as a 'penalty' when the government later
seeks to recover them does not alter their essential character as taxes for purposes of the Bankruptcy
Act." Id. at 275.
95. Id. at 279.
96. Id. at 280.
97. Id. at 280 (quoting United States Comptroller General Opinion, B-137762 (May 3, 1977), in 9
Standard Federal Tax Reporter, 6614, (CCH) 71,438 (1977)).
98. Sotelo, 436 U.S. at 287.
99. Id. at 288.
100. "[T]he lifelong liability which the Court imposes today falls on the shoulders of one who was
the chief executive officer of a small family business .. " Sotelo, 436 U.S. at 290-91 (emphasis
added).
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neither the language of the Bankruptcy Act nor the policies behind it could
support the majority's decision, Senator DeConcini made it clear just a few
months later in his explanation of the Bankruptcy Code that the position
adopted by the majority in Sotelo was the position adopted for the new
legislation.0
10 2
2. Lauckner v. United States

The government discovered that Mr. Lauckner met the tests as a
responsible officer of AAA Trucking Corporation.
The discovery,
however, came after the previously presumed date on which the statute of
limitations expired for making a 6672. Prior to Lauckner, the government
used as the statute of limitation for the 6672 liability the date on which the
statute expired with respect to additional assessments against the
corporation that failed to pay the collected taxes. In support of its
assessment after the date on which one could be made against the
corporation, the government argued that 6672 was an assessable penalty
and, as such, did not have a statute of limitations on assessment. Mr.
Lauckner argued that the assessment was time barred citing the previous
position of the IRS concerning the statute of limitations for the 6672
liability.
The only Circuit Court addressing the issue of the statute of
limitations on assessment of the liability imposed by 6672 determined that
the government does not have an unlimited amount of time to assess this
liability, as with other assessable penalties, but has a limitations period
established by the underlying liability with respect to the corporation that
collected the unpaid tax.' 3 This determination, having nothing specifically
to do with interest on the 6672 liability, aligns perfectly with the position
that interest on the 6672 liability should not look to the interest provisions
101. See 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6505, 6566:
Statement by the Hon. Dennis DeConcini, Chairman of the subcommittee on
improvements in judicial machinery of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, upon
introducing the Senate Amendment to the House Amendment to H.R. 8200... Taxes
which the debtor was required by law to withhold or collect from others and for which he
is liable in any capacity, regardless of the age of the tax claims... In addition, this
category includes the liability of a responsible officer under the Internal Revenue Code
(sec. 6672)... and the priority will cover the debtor's responsible officer liability
regardless of the age of the tax year to which the tax relates. The U.S. Supreme Court
has interpreted present law to require the same result as will be reached under this rule.
U.S. v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. (1978). This category also includes the liability under
section 3505 of the Internal Revenue Code of a taxpayer who loans money for the
payment of wages or other compensation. (Emphasis added).
102. Lauckner v. United States, No. 93-1594, 1994 WL 837464, at *7 (D.N.J. May 4, 1994), aff'd
per curiam, 68 F.3d 69 (3d Cir. 1995).
103. Id.
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applicable to assessable penalties but rather should run from the due date of
the return giving rise to the liability.
No specific code section sets out a statute of limitations for the
assessment of the 6672 liability. 0 4 For many years the IRS took the
position that the statute of limitations on assessment of the 6672 liability
mirrored the statute of limitations for the underlying tax and ran for three
years from April 15 of the year following the end of the quarter in
question. 10 5 This position followed the general rule found in 6501. Section
6501, however, applies to liabilities based on tax returns.
Probably because of a series of victories regarding the statute of
limitations in cases under 6700 and 6701,1°6 in 1994 the IRS suddenly
seemed to come to the realization that 6672 was placed into the Code as an
assessable penalty that was not based on a tax return. It then concluded
that 6672 was a statute without a controlling provision with respect to the
statute of limitations and made an assessment that would have been time
barred under its previous interpretation of the statute of limitations as it
applied to 6672.'07
To support its "new" position, the IRS made numerous arguments, all
of which were rejected. First, the IRS argued that the 6672 liability
constitutes a "separate and distinct" liability from the I.R.C. 3403 liability
imposed on the employer.10 8 The opening paragraph of the Lauckner
104. See I.R.S. CCA 200112003 (March 23, 2001) for a general discussion of the statute of
limitations on penalties in subchapter 68B and a specific discussion of whether a statute of limitation on
assessment of the penalty imposed under 6707 exists.
105. United States v. Hodgekins, 805 F. Supp. 653, 658 (N.D. Ind. 1992); Turk v. United States,
No. $92-307M, 1993 WL 497785, at *6 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 17, 1993); Stallard v. United States, 12 F.3d
489, 493 (5th Cir. 1994).
106. See Mullikin v. United States, 952 F.2d 920, 933 (6th Cir. 1991); Lamb v. United States, 977
F.2d 1296, 1297 (8th Cir. 1992); Capozzi v. United States, 980 F.2d 872, 875 (2d Cir. 1992); Sage v.
United States, 908 F.2d 18, 25 (5th Cir. 1990).
107. Lauckner v. United States, No. 93-1594, 1994 WL 837464, at *7 (D.N.J. May 4, 1994), aff'd
per curiam, 68 F.3d 69 (3d Cir. 1995).
108. Numerous authorities exist for the proposition that the liability under 6672 is separate and
distinct from the liability of the entity for the collected taxes. None of the authorities set the issue up in
quite the way that Bradley v. United States, 936 F.2d 707, 710 (2nd Cir. 1991) does. In Bradley the IRS
assessed 6672 liabilities against two individuals, Charles Bradley and David Agnew, for failure of
Maxim Industries, Inc. (Maxim) to pay withheld employment and social security taxes. Id. at 709.
After the 6672 assessments were made against Bradley and Agnew they paid a portion of the tax, filed a
claim for refund and then filed suit. Id. Also after the 6672 assessments were made, Maxim filed a
Chapter II bankruptcy petition. Id. Because it appeared that Maxim might have sufficient funds to
fully pay the outstanding employment tax liability through the bankruptcy case, the parties in the refund
suit agreed to dismiss the refund suit subject to reinstatement. Id. Maxim did pay all of the
employment taxes through the bankruptcy case together with all of the interest for which it was liable;
however, because interest does not accrue in Chapter II bankruptcy cases on unsecured claims between
the date of the petition and the confirmation of the plan, the IRS sought to collect the interest for this
period of time from the two responsible officers. Id. They resisted and the refund suit was reinstated
setting up the issue of whether the IRS could do so. Id. at 708.
The Second Circuit laid out the issue as follows: "Essentially, plaintiffs contend that since
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opinion sets the tone for the court's view of the government position;
however, its rejection of the government's position stems from exactly the
reasoning that supports imposing interest on the responsible officer equal to
the interest on the entity. In describing the nature of the liability under
6672, the court stated "[a]s of the moment payment was due and
10 9 not made,
both the employer and any responsible officer became liable."
The court found that "it seems clear that courts have based the lower
standard of conduct necessary to trigger § 6672 liability [for willfulness] on
their understanding, unchallenged until now, that § 6672 functions only as
a collection device, not as a truly 'separate and distinct' penalty."'1 1 The
court went on to hold that the 6672 assessment is separate only for
purposes of collection.
The government argued that "because the responsible person assessed
under § 6672 files no return with respect to the assessment, the assessment
is not made with respect to any return, and the § 6501(a) limitations period
on assessments is never triggered.""' On this issue the court found,
however, that the 6672 liability was in fact based on the employment tax
return triggering the running of the statute of limitations under 6501. It
examined several cases that had noted 'no return' is filed concerning 6672
liabilities and determined that "[t]hese cases do not stand for the
proposition that § 6672 penalties are not assessed with respect to any
return."' 12 Therefore, it concluded that to the extent that there was
something about 6672 that was "separate and distinct" from the employer
liability it was "only for purposes of collection."" 3 Important for purposes
of this article, the court held that "the
' 14 assessment itself is based on the
underlying liability of the employer." "
If the assessment is based on the underlying liability of the employer
and is not a separate and distinct liability, then separating the two for
purposes of assessing interest makes little sense. The logical point for
Maxim has paid its tax liability and related interest, the Internal Revenue Code provides no authority for
charging plaintiffs with interest for the period during which Maxim was in bankruptcy. This argument
mischaracterizes the legal basis for the assessments against plaintiffs. Strictly speaking, liability under
section 6672(a) is not derived from, or dependent upon, an employer's outstanding tax obligation.
Rather, the section imposes a penalty upon persons who fail to perform a specified statutory task. We
have consistently held, therefore, that the liability for such a penalty is separate and distinct from the
employer's liability for trust fund taxes." Id. at 710.
109. Lauckner, 1994 WL 837464 at * 1. The similarities noted by the court between 6672 and 3403
parallel the similarities in the treatment of these liabilities in the bankruptcy code. These similarities
form the basis for the government's policy decision in adopting Policy Statement 5-60, in which it
states that the liability will only be collected once. The separateness discussed in Bradley, however,
does seem more separate than the discussion in Lauckner addresses.
110. Lauckner, 1994 WL 837464. at *4.
111. Id. at "5.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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imposing interest against the responsible officer is the same point when it
arises with respect to the corporation since the liabilities are separate and
distinct only for purposes of collection.1 15 The separateness for purposes of
collection describes the separateness of the actual assessment. The IRS
creates an assessment for each individual or entity liable for the 6672
liability and has a separate assessment for the person liable for the
underlying tax which includes not only the collected taxes but also the
employer portion of the liability as well.11 6
In an Action on Decision dated July, 15, 1996, the IRS acquiesced in
the result in Lauckner.117 While the sudden change in the IRS position on
the statute of limitations seemed to also influence the court's decision in
Lauckner," 8 the basis for its conclusion supports the policy behind the
position that the 6672 liability should result in interest running with the
employment tax liability to which it is so closely aligned. While the
decision in Lauckner did not leave the IRS in any worse position than it
was in before it realized that 6672 was an assessable penalty just like 6701,
the picture now clearly presents 6672 as an assessable penalty with the
worst of both worlds. It does not have the unlimited statute of limitations
enjoyed by other assessable penalties since it is viewed as being tied to a
return; however it does have the interest provisions of 6601(e), discussed
infra, with other assessable penalties, denying the running of interest until
the assessment occurs. This is an odd combination of handicaps to place
on a liability protecting the funds held in trust for the United States and a
liability so important that, unlike any other assessable penalty, Congress
gives it not only priority status in bankruptcy but priority status for the life
of the collection statute.
E. THE PROBLEM OF INTEREST

As alluded to above, the placement of 6672 in the assessable penalty
115. See the argument in Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 25, United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268,
(1978) (No. 76-1800). "Liability for taxes under Section 6672 is deemed 'due and owing' on the date
the person responsible for seeing the taxes are paid failed to do so - the date the corporate returns were
due to be filed."
116. The IRS made additional arguments in Lauckner based on the relevant return for purposes of
I.R.C. § 6501(a) and Congressional intent. These arguments were also rejected with the reasoning that
covers matters not related to this paper.
117. I.R.S. A.O.D. 1996-006, 1996-2 C.B. 1.
118. Lauckner, 1994 WL 837464 at *1. In the second paragraph of the opinion the court clearly
expresses its concern that the IRS position reflected a reversal of its long held position concerning the
applicable state of limitations. "It argues for perpetual exposure despite its long-standing position to the
contrary, coupled with judicial acceptance and congressional acquiescence for more than 30 years.
Such a radical change must come from the legislature and not the courts, particularly where it seeks to
leave persons exposed to tax liability in perpetuity." Id.
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provisions positions it for treatment with respect to interest that contradicts
the purpose of 6672 and that creates a lack of parallel structure with
similarly situated taxpayers. To understand how this works requires
analyzing the interest provisions.
1. The Mechanics of the Interest Provisions in IRC 6601
Section 6601 sets out the rules, not the rates, for interest on liabilities
imposed in Title 26. The rule for taxes found in 6601(a) provides that
interest runs "from the last date prescribed for payment of the tax to the
date on which payment is received."1 19 The last date prescribed for
payment of taxes generally coincides with the due date of the tax return for
that tax without taking into account extensions of the date for filing. 120 For
example, the due date for individual income taxes falls on the 15th day of
the fourth month following the close of the tax year.12' That date, April 15,
starts the running of interest for individual taxpayers for the calendar year
that ended immediately prior to that April. If an individual remits payment
for a income tax prior to April 15 either by withholding, estimated
payments or payment with the return, then no interest accrues with respect
to that year's tax liability (unless a subsequent assessment occurs). If an
individual does not remit sufficient funds by April 15 to cover the tax
liability for the preceding year, then interest begins to run on April 16 and
runs until full remittance reaches the IRS or the IRS abates the tax.
The general rule for interest on income taxes described above also
applies to employment taxes. The employment tax return due date comes
at the end of the month immediately following the end of the quarter, e.g.,
April 30th for the first quarter. If the employment taxes due for the first
quarter remain unpaid as of the April 30th immediately following the end
of the quarter then interest begins to run and continues running until paid.
The rule for interest on assessable penalties follows a different path.
The Treasury Regulation interpreting I.R.C. 6601(e)(2) provides that
"interest will not be imposed on any assessable penalty, . . . if the amount is

paid within 21 calendar days... from the date of the notice and demand. If
interest is imposed, it will be imposed only for the period from the date 1of
22
the notice and demand to the date on which payment is received.9
Notice and demand occurs simultaneously with or immediately following
the assessment of a liability. 2 3 Since 6672 falls into the assessable penalty
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Treas. Reg. § 301.6601-1(a) (as amended in 1997).
I.R.C. § 615 1(a).
I.R.C. § 6072(a).
Treas. Reg. § 301.6601-1(0(3) (as amended in 1997).
I.R.C. § 6303; Treas. Reg. § 301.6303-1 (as amended in 2001).
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section of the Code, this provision and not the provision for taxes applies to
the running of interest on assessments made pursuant to this statute. That
difference appears to result solely from the placement of 6672 in the Code
and no explanation for its placement with respect to interest exists in the
legislative history of 6672 or 6601.
2. Problems Created by the Interest Provisions Applicable to 6672
Because of 6672's placement as an assessable penalty and the
consequent application of IRC 6601(e) rather than IRC 6601(a), three
problems exist with respect to the application of 6672. First, the delay in
the running of interest against responsible officers treats similarly situated
taxpayers in a disparate manner. This creates a fairness issue. Second, the
treatment of interest for those liable pursuant to the derivative liability of
6672 works differently than the interest charged to those derivatively liable
under similar statutes. This highlights a lack of a consistent approach with
respect to parties held liable when the initial taxpayer did not fulfill its
obligation. Third, the delay in the running of interest creates problems for
the IRS. It loses the time value of money for the period between the return
due date and the date of assessment of the responsible officer. This interest
free period also harms the IRS because it creates an incentive for
responsible officers to delay and burden the system of administration to
gain the benefit of the time value of money. The postponement of interest
also puts the federal government at odds with its state counterparts
providing an incentive for responsible officers to satisfy their state
obligations for unpaid collected taxes first.
a. The disparatetreatment of similarly situated taxpayers
That the form of an entity or a transaction can control the outcome in a
tax matter needs no citations. Nonetheless, in certain matters varying
results based simply on form can create cries for fairness. 2 4 Section 6672
creates a lack of fairness with respect to the imposition of interest between
those individuals who incorporate their business and those who do not.
Changing the statute to charge persons liable under 6672 with interest back
to the due date of the entity's return would eliminate that inequality.
The form of the entity definitely matters to the person who decides not
124. See Thomas E. Fritz, Flowthrough Entities and the Self-Employment Tax: Is it Time for a
Uniform Standard?, 17 VA. TAX REv. 811 (1997-1998); Fred B. Brown, FederalIncome Taxation of
US Branches of Foreign Corporations: Separate Entity or Separate Rules?, 49 TAX L. REV. 133,
(1993).
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to pay over collected taxes. If the person has employed corporate form,
then the collection against that individual will take place through 6672 with
no interest accruing and no penalties until the point of assessment. If,
however, the person does business as a sole proprietorship or a single
member LLC treated as a disregarded entity, then that person is liable for
interest on the unpaid employment taxes from the due date of the return.
Looking at the original example used in this article can provide some
insight into this problem. Assume that Bob, Mary and John ran ABC as a
partnership in which they were general partners rather than a corporation.
If ABC fails to pay $50,000 in withheld income taxes for the first quarter of
2008 over to the government by April 30, 2008, the due date of the
employment tax return for the first quarter, interest will run from April 30,
2008. Each of them as general partners is liable for the full amount of the
unpaid withheld income taxes ($50,000) plus interest from April 30, 2008.
If Bob ran ABC as a sole proprietorship instead he would also be liable for
the full amount of the tax plus interest from April 30, 2008. If, however,
ABC were incorporated, interest would not run against Bob, Mary and John
as responsible officers until the 6672 was made against them. Assuming 5
percent simple interest and an assessment on April 30, 2010, two years
after the return due date, the savings in interest would be approximately
$5,000.
Senator Ervin in his floor statements concerning the amendment of the
Bankruptcy Act to include section 17a(l)(e) and the majority of the
Supreme Court in Sotelo both expressed concerns about the equality of
treatment persons liable for collected taxes who had incorporated versus
those who ran their businesses as a sole proprietorship. The two parties
addressed the subject from the perspective of the discharge in bankruptcy at
issue in Sotelo; however, the reasoning could apply to the difference
created with respect to the running of interest. The Court in Sotelo quoted
Senator Ervin's statements made during the consideration of the
amendment to the Bankruptcy Act of section 17a(1)(e) "The inequity
between a corporate officer and an individual entrepreneur, both of whom
have a similar liability to the government, frequently would turn on nothing
more than whether the individual was 'sophisticated' enough 'to, in effect,
incorporate himself."" 25
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority in Sotelo, expressed similar
concerns of fairness as a basis for the majority's decision. "The dissenting
opinion recognizes Congress' unquestioned concern about eliminating
corporations' 'unfair' advantage over individual entrepreneurs. Elsewhere
our Brother Rehnquist appears to concede that Congress meant 'to

125. United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 281 (1978) (quoting 112 CONG. REC. 13809, 13817
(1966)).
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ameliorate the lot' of only 'some bankrupts' when it passed the 1966
amendment to the Bankruptcy Act. There is every indication that the 1966
amendment was not intended 'to ameliorate the lot' of corporations and
their principal officers, at least with regard to taxes collected from
employees. And the dissenting opinion has not even attempted to explain
how a Congress concerned about '[discrimination] against the private
individual or the unincorporated small businessman,' could have thought it
just to relieve corporate officers of § 6672 liability in bankruptcy, as the
dissent's approach would do, while leaving other owners of 'small family
[businesses],' those who happen to operate
1 26 through non corporate
entities-subject to the same kind of liability.
While slightly different in nature, the same type of disparity that
concerned Senator Ervin and Justice Marshall still exists in the application
of 6672 because of the manner in which interest and penalties are treated.
Those who fail to incorporate and fail to pay collected taxes pay the higher
price even though the policy for collecting the tax seems identical in both
instances. This disparity prevents a parallel result between similarly
situated taxpayers. This lack of parallelism does not promote effective tax
administration and fails to achieve a sense of fairness desired in tax
legislation. 127 The disparity also1 28fosters the wrong incentive to promote
prompt payment and compliance.
b. The misalignment with similarstatutes
Section 6672 provides a mechanism for holding third parties liable for
the payment of a tax for which a corporate entity has primary liability. The
derivative nature of the liability imposed by 6672 creates an exception to
126. Sotelo, 436 U.S. at 281 n.16 (internal citations omitted).
127. Much has been written on the role of horizontal equity and parallelism in tax legislation. These
concepts are important because taxpayer perceptions are important. Enforced compliance measures by
the IRS cannot account for the level of compliance by the taxpaying public. Fairness in the system is
critical. Jeffrey H. Kahn, The Mirage of Equivalence and the Ethereal Principles of Parallelismand
Horizontal Equity, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 645 (2006). In this article, Professor Kahn devises a test to
determine when parallel treatment of a specific tax circumstance is desirable and when countervailing
considerations drive nonparallel treatment as the correct result. He did not test this situation. Using his
tests a strong argument exists for parallel treatment with respect to interest between individuals who fail
to pay over monies held in trust for the government. These individuals whether operating as a sole
proprietorship, partnership, or in corporate form have already received parallel treatment-the very
reason for piercing the corporate veil. No reason exists for departing from that parallel treatment in the
imposition of interest. See also Dave Elkins, HorizontalEquity as a Principleof Tax Theory, 24 YALE
L. & POL'Y REv. 43 (2006); Richard Winchester, The Gap in the Tax Gap: What Congress Should Do
About It (June 25, 2008). Thomas Jefferson School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 1151363,
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1 151363 (addressing parallelism in employment tax issues).
128. Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance, 64
OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1456 (2003).
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the normal rule for liability but not a unique situation. Other statutes also
create derivative tax liabilities for third parties not primarily liable for the
tax. The executor provision of 31 U.S.C. 3713, the transferee liability
provisions of 6901, and the lender liability provisions of 3505 each provide
a parallel situation to 6672. These statutes offer another view regarding the
accrual of interest against third parties. Of these three, 3505 deserves the
most attention since it sprang from perceived inadequacies in 6672.
The so-called insolvency statute found in 31 U.S.C. 3713 applies to
situations broader than just tax. Essentially, it holds someone like an
executor personally liable for the payment of the taxes of an estate when
the executor distributes assets to beneficiaries or pays out lower priority
creditors without satisfying the taxes of the estate. The person liable under
the insolvency statute must pay interest (and penalties) on their personal
liability stemming from misapplication of estate assets to the extent that the
value of29the assets distributed exceeds the amount of the outstanding
liability.1

A transferee under 6901 also must pay interest depending on the value
of the property transferred. The extent of the liability is the transferor's
unpaid taxes (including interest and penalties) for the transfer year and
prior years to the extent of the value of the assets plus interest. 130 Whether
a transferee is liable to the full extent of the transferor generally depends on
the value of the asset(s) transferred together with the amount of the liability
at issue. Where the transferred assets exceed in value the amount of the
liability, the transferee will generally be liable for interest and penalties on
the transferor's taxes.' 31 If the transferred assets are less than the amount
of the liability, the transferee's liability is generally capped at the value of
the assets received with the possibility that under state law interest might
accrue on the value of the assets received.1 32 If a notice of transferee
liability is sent, the transferee is liable for interest on the amount assessed
pursuant to that notice. The interest runs from the date of the notice of

129. See United States v. Estate of Kime, 950 F.Supp. 950, 954 (D. Neb. 1996) (finding the
Insolvency Statute holds a representative of an estate liable for the unpaid tax liability, interest, and
penalties of the estate); United States v. Coppola, 85 F.3d 1015, 1020-21 (2d Cir. 1996) (limiting the
liability of the representative to the amount of the payment made or the value of the assets distributed
before taxes are paid; importantly, the court found that the executor was liable for the unpaid taxes plus
interest under 31 U.S.C. § 3713).
130. Papineau v. Comm'r, 28 T.C. 54, 58 (1957); Yagoda v. Comm'r, 39 T.C. 170, 186 (1962),
aft'd, 331 F.2d 485, 492 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 842 (1964). The cap on the liability
described here applies to transferee cases "in equity." Generally, no cap exists for transferee cases "at
law."
131. Lowy v. Comm'r, 35 T.C. 393, 394-95 (1960). For a general discussion on the issue of interest
on transferee liability see Theodore D. Peyser, Transferee Liability, 628-2d TAX MGMT. (BNA) A-2527 (2003); MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 17-27-33 (Warren Gorham
Lamont 1991) (1981).
132. Stein v. Comm'r, 37 T.C. 945, 961 (1962), supp. op., 40 T.C. 275 (1963).
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transferee liability.
Someone tagged with liability under the insolvency or the transferee
statutes must pay interest back to the due date of the return of the person
primarily liable. This general rule is tempered in some situations by the
amount of assets the third party received vis a vis the amount of the total
tax liability. If the value of assets in the estate or the value of assets
transferred are below the amount of the primary liability, the liability of the
third party is capped at the value of the assets. 6672 does not have a direct
parallel to this provision limiting interest; however, the manner in which
the taxpayer whose tax is collected receives full credit for that payment
provides a basis for viewing the 6672 situation as one in which the
corporation and the responsible officer received assets equal in value to the
unpaid liability. 134 The policies leading to imposition of interest against
these third parties support the imposition of interest back to the due date of
the underlying return for those persons responsible under 6672.
The most significant of the three derivative liability provisions with
respect to the treatment of interest is 3505 because it developed out of a
loophole in 6672 and deals with a subset of the same liability that 6672
does.
In the 1950s and early 1960s, lending practices in the construction
industry exposed a gap in the coverage of 6672 with respect to income and
social security taxes withheld from employees of troubled businesses in
that employment sector. In closing that gap, Congress created a new
statute that specifically provides that the third party liable under the new
statute has liability for the interest from the due date of the return of the
party primarily liable for the unpaid tax. While the legislative history of
the new statute does not provide any insight as to why the interest provision
appears in this new statute (and not in 6672), the adoption of the interest
provision in 3505 supports the imposition of interest for all collected tax
situations.
Section 3505 was enacted as part of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966

133. Patterson v. Sims, 281 F.2d 577, 581 (5th Cir. 1960). The courts are split on the liability for
accrued interest if the underlying tax is an estate or gift tax. Compare Baptiste v. Comm'r, 29 F.3d 433,
438 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1190 (1995) with Baptiste v. Comm'r, 29 F.3d 1533, 1535
( lIth Cir. 1994).
134. See e.g., I.R.C. § 31 (2008). Section 31(a) provides that "the amount withheld.., shall be
allowed to the recipient of the income as a credit against the tax imposed by this subtitle." This
provision insures that a worker whose wages have been reduced by the amount of the withheld taxes
will receive credit for payment of those taxes even if the company that withheld the taxes fails to pay
them over to the government. This credit extends even to the taxes withheld on the wages of
individuals determined to be responsible for failure to pay over the withheld taxes. As a consequence,
the government, through this provision, grants full value for the withheld taxes whether it receives that
value or not. This granting of full value provides an equivalent to the transferee who has received from
the taxpayer material equal to or greater than the value of the taxes owed by the transferor.
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at the request of the government to plug what it perceived to be a loophole
in the collection of withheld employment taxes.
The specific loophole
3505 sought to address concerned third parties who paid, either directly or
indirectly, the wages for an employer in such a manner that the withheld
employment taxes did not get paid over to the government. 136 Section 3505
does not address all types of collected taxes discussed in footnote 5, supra.
It imposes liability on lenders, sureties, and others who lend net payroll in a
manner that causes a failure to pay over to the government withheld federal
income tax, FICA tax and railroad retirement tax. The statute has two
components: 3505(a) imposes liability for the full amount of the unpaid tax
on third parties who pay net wages directly to the employees, and 3505(b)
imposes a limited personal liability on third parties who provide the funds
used to make net payroll payments of no more than 25 percent of the
unpaid employment taxes.'
As mentioned above, the collection problem
135. See H.R. REP. No. 89-1884, (1966), reprinted in 1966-2 C.B. 815, 828-30; S.REP. NO. 891708, (1966), reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3722, 3724, 3742-45 (one of the statements provided in
the legislative history here describes 3505 as "intended to represent a reasonable accommodation of the
interests of the govenment in collecting the taxes of delinquent taxpayers with the rights of taxpayers
and third parties."). One commentator states that "prior to 1966 no lender or other institutional creditor
had ever been held liable for the § 6672 penalty." Larry A. Makel & James C. Chadwick, Lender
Liabilityfor a Borrower's UnpaidPayroll Taxes, 43 Bus. LAW. 507, 520 n.56 (1988).
136. The term for this practice, net payroll financing, does not appear in the statute but found
common usage during the discussion of the need for this provision as described in United States v.
Algernon Blair, Inc., 441 F.2d 1379, 1381 (5th Cir. 1971):
Prior to the effective date of § 3505(b), problems arose with the construction
industry's device known as 'net payroll financing.'
Using this method, a subcontractor-employer, who had financially overextended himself would go to a lender,
in this case the prime contractor, for financial assistance. The prime contractor-lender,
desirous of having the sub-contractor complete the work, but also wanting to minimize
costs would provide only the net payroll funds. In many of these situations, the United
States would never receive the withholding taxes due, even though the employees
received credit on the records of the Treasury Department as if the taxes had been
paid. While the sub-contractor-employer would still be liable for the taxes under §§
3102(b) and 3404 of the Code, recourse against the employer was often fruitless, as he
was financially unable to pay the taxes.
137. I.R.C. § 3505 (2008) provides:
(a) Direct payment by third parties. For purposes of sections 3102, 3202, 3402 and
3403, if a lender, surety, or other person, who is not an employer under such sections
with respect to an employee or group of employees, pays wages directly to such an
employee or group of employees, employed by one or more employers, to an agent on
behalf of such employee or employees, such lender, surety, or other person shall be
liable in his own person and estate to the United States in a sum equal to the taxes
(togetherwith interest) required to be deducted and withheld from such wages by such
employer.
(b) Personal liability where funds are supplied. If a lender, surety, or other person
supplies funds to or for the account of an employer for the specific purpose of paying
wages of the employees of such employer, with actual notice or knowledge (within the
meaning of section 6323(i)(1) that such employer does not intend to or will not be able
to make timely payment or deposit of the amounts of tax required by this subtitle to be
deducted and withheld by such employer from such wages, such lender, surety, or
other person shall be liable in his own person and estate to the United States in a sum
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the IRS primarily sought to address through this legislation involved the
construction industry.
Prior to the enactment of 3505, the IRS lost several cases in which it
attempted to assert the 6672 penalty against the type of third parties
described in 3505.13 Courts determined that such individuals were willful
but not responsible. At the same time, the alleged responsible persons
would win their cases under 6672 because they were responsible but not
willful. These responsible persons would testify, usually quite correctly,
that the lender would not permit them to pay the employment taxes even
though they had tried to do so. Section 3505 filled the gap caused by the
circumstances of the lender who essentially controlled the finances of a
cash-poor entity but whose role did not neatly fit the statutory scheme of
6672.
Two common situations occurred that posed problems for the IRS in
attaching the 6672 penalty where employment taxes were not paid. The
first, and perhaps most common, scenario involved companies with cash
flow problems. These companies would negotiate a line of credit with a
bank. As business worsened the bank's involvement increased. At some
point in the relationship, a loan officer at the bank essentially took over the
duty of approving every check written by the company. The loan officer
then made decisions to pay employees their wages but also refused to allow
equal to the taxes (togetherwith interest) which are not paid over to the United States
by such employer with respect to such wages. However, the liability of such lender
surety, or other person shall be limited to an amount equal to 25 percent of the amount
so supplied to or for the account of such employer for such purpose.
(c) Effect of payment. Any amounts paid to the United States pursuant to this section
shall be credited against the liability of the employer." (emphasis added).
138. "As of January, 1965, the delinquent accounts in the construction industry totaled
$55,608,622.00, which was twenty-six percent of all delinquencies of this type of taxes. As of the same
date, $29,730,508.00 of the $55,608,622.00, or fifty-three percent, had been overdue for more than one
year. And according to the same Treasury figures, it had written off in 1964, as uncollectible from the
construction industry, the sum of $16,290,098.00, which was twenty-eight percent of all unpaid
withholding taxes for all industries written off during that year." Edward Gallagher, The Good and the
Badfor Surety Companies Under the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966, 34 INS. CoUNs. J. 214, 218 (1967).
139. United States v. Hill, 368 F.2d 617, 623 (5th Cir. 1966) ("[T]he bank agreed to loan to the
corporation funds to complete jobs in progress. The only control which the bank exercised during this
period was in connection with the funds which it loaned. Taxpayer Hill admitted at trial that he
understood the bank's refusal to honor checks for taxes drawn on these funds to be merely a statement
that the bank would not loan the corporation funds for the taxes. Certainly this refusal to make a loan
did not place the bank in control of the corporation's checking account or alter appellants' control of the
corporation."); GirardTrust Corn Exchange Bank v. United States, 259 F.Supp. 214, 216-17 (E.D. Pa.
1966); United States v. Park Cities Bank & Trust Co., 481 F.2d 738, 741 (5th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 441 F.2d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Coconut Grove Bank, 545
F.2d 502, 506 n.2 (5th Cir. 1977) (lists the cases). Many of the cases cited in this footnote and listed in
Coconut Grove Bank include additional arguments by the United States in its attempts to hold the third
party lenders liable. Seeking to hold the lender liable under a contract theory and seeking to hold it
liable as the "true" employer were the primary additional theories. Those arguments are not important
to the purpose of this article.
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the company to write the employment tax check to the IRS. The company
would eventually fail and the IRS would come looking for the employment
taxes.
The second variation on this theme usually occurred in the
construction industry.140 A general contractor would hire a subcontractor to
complete a specific task on a larger job. The subcontractor would
The general contractor needed the
encounter financial difficulty.
subcontractor to complete the task for which it had been hired or the entire
project would fall behind with all of the attendant consequences. The
employees of the subcontractor who were not getting paid would refuse to
work without pay. So, the general contractor or its surety would step into
the breach and pay the net wages of the employees of the subcontractor. At
some point the subcontractor would fail before the employment taxes were
paid.
As mentioned above, 3505 has two components which attempt to
address problems presented by both direct payment of net payroll by a third
party and indirect payment of net payroll. Section 3505(a) holds a person
liable in an amount equal to the entire amount of the payroll taxes required
to be withheld and paid over in those situations in which the third party
directly pays the wages of the employees of the company that fails to pay
its employment taxes. The 3505(a) liability arises upon the payment of the
or not the third party knows taxes should be paid or
wages whether
14 1
withheld.
Section 3505(a) prevents third parties from taking over a company's
payroll and paying net wages. The third party becomes liable not only for
taxes on the wages from the date the wages are paid but the third party is
liable also for interest back to the due date of the return. Imposing liability
as "fair" because the third
on a third party in this situation was viewed
1 42
party knows the finances of the employer.
The liability under 3505(a) is not imposed by way of assessment as
with 6672. In order to hold a third party liable under 3505 the government
must bring a suit against the third party. The statute of limitations for the

140. See Algernon Blair, Inc., 441 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1971).
141. Abrams v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 1134, 1147 (S.D. W. Va. 1971). A later court set up a
two part test that must be satisfied in order for a payment to be considered a direct payment of wages
under 3505(a). First, the payor must have the ability to control the funds. If the employer controls the
funds then the situation would shift from 3505(a) to some other provision such as 3505(b) or 6672.
Second, the payor must have the right and legal authority to exercise that control. United States v. Fred
A. Arnold, Inc., 573 F.2d 605, 608 (9th Cir. 1978); see also United States v. Kennedy Construction Co.
of NSB, 572 F.2d 492, 496 (5th Cir. 1978); Derr v. United States, 498 F. Supp. 337, 340 (W.D. Wis.
1980).
142. H.R. REP. No. 89-1884, (1966), reprinted in 1966-2 C.B. 815, 829; S. REP. NO. 89-1708,
(1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3722, 3743.
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suit is the statute of limitations on collection of the underlying liability.
The government bears the burden of proof in the litigation to show that the
third party directly made net payroll payments to the employer.
The existence of 3505(a) has undoubtedly caused lenders to change
their practices to avoid this pitfall. 144 Very few 3505(a) cases exist.145 A
lender directly paying net payroll has little room to hide. This provision
serves an important role in prevention but receives little enforcement
attention because of the straightforward and predictable outcomes it
creates.
Section 3505(b) does not impose the broad liability set out in
subparagraph (a). Nor does 3505(b) involve the relatively easy to identify
direct payment of net wages. Instead, 3505(b) concerns the actions of
those who provide funds to the employer knowing that the funds will be
used to meet payroll and that the employment taxes will not be paid.
As with 3505(a) the liability under subsection (b) does not occur
through an administrative assessment but rather the government must bring
a suit to establish the liability. The government has the burden of proof in
the suit. The liability under 3505(b) has a limitation of 25 percent of the
amounts paid to the employer for the purpose of making net wage
payments. The statute provides for interest back to the due date of the
return; however, case law has limited the amount of interest recoverable by
treating it
as a part of the 25 percent cap and not an addition to that
46
amount. 1

143. Treas. Reg. § 31.3505-1(d) (as amended in 1995) provides: "In the event the lender, surety, or
other person does not satisfy the liability imposed by Section 3505, the United States may collect the
liability by appropriate civil proceedings commenced within 10 years after assessment of the tax against
the employer."
144. In fact Congress anticipated that lenders would take certain precautions to avoid the liability
under this statute. "'[S]ureties can protect themselves against any losses attributable to withholding
taxes by including this risk of liability in establishing their premiums, and lenders by including the
amounts in their loans and taking adequate security."' Jersey Shore State Bank v. United States, 479
U.S. 442, 449 (1987), (citing S. Rep. No. 89-1708, reprinted in 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3722, 3744 and
H.R. Rep. 89-1884, reprintedin 1966-2 C.B. 815, 830).
145. See Julius Thannhauser et al., Lender's Liabilityfor Unpaid Withholding Taxes of BorrowerEmployer-IRC Sections 3505 and 6672, 80 CoM. L. J. 137 (1975); See also Mark R. Hinkston,
Dealing with the Disarray:The Eighth Circuit Addresses Notice and Demand Applicability to Lenders'
Liability For Withholding Taxes Under I.R.C. 3505(b)-United States v. Messina Builders and
Contractors Co., 20 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1093, 1099 n.26 (1987) (this article has an excellent
introductory section on the legislative history of 3505).
146. The IRS took the position initially that interest due from the third party under 3505(b) added
onto the 25 percent. Treas. Reg. § 31.3505-1(b) (as amended in 1995); Rev. Proc. 78-13, 1978-1 C.B.
591. It lost this issue in three circuits. See United States v. Metro Constr. Co., 602 F.2d 879, 882 (9th
Cir. 1979); United States v. Intercontinental ndustr., Inc., 635 F.2d 1215, 1222 (6th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Hannan Co., 639 F.2d 284, 285 (5th Cir. 1981). After these losses, the IRS abandoned the
position that the person liable under 3505(b) must pay interest in addition to the 25 percent of net
payroll. See I.R.S. Litigation Guideline Mem. GL-14 (May 4, 1994).
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A lender has knowledge for purposes of 3505(b) from (1) the time the
lender receives notice of this fact 47 or (2) the time the lender would have
known if exercising due diligence. 148 Because the liability under 3505(b)
requires the government to show this knowledge, the government can
experience difficulty establishing this liability. The government does not
need to prove, however, that a formal loan agreement existed.
Honoring
1 49
overdrafts over a period of time can also trigger this liability.
An exception to 3505(b) liability for lending for net payroll occurs
for working capital loans. Perhaps the exception need not have been
explicitly stated in the statute because of the knowledge provision of the
statute, nonetheless it exists as a stated exception. Lenders must take care
when making working capital loans if they learn that the loans finance net
payroll.1 50 Likewise, lenders pursuing remedies upon default of a loan do
not enter 3505(b) territo1 7t unless they become too entwined in the business
of the distressed entity. 5
Because the liability under 3505 is not considered a tax liability, the
interest component referred to in the statutes does not represent interest on
the employment taxes themselves. 152 The liability of the lender is for a sum
equal to the unpaid trust fund portion of the employment taxes rather than
the taxes due from the employer. 53 Depending on the type of 3505
liability, the third party may have no interest liability because of the
interpretation of the 25 percent cap in 3505(b). Nonetheless, the statute
does contemplate in general that the third party engaged in the actions
described by 3505 is liable for interest on the delinquent employment taxes.
Two examples demonstrate how the interest component of 3505 works:
147. Once the fact that funds are being used for net payroll is brought to the attention of the lender,
the lender is deemed to meet the knowledge part of this test. United States v. Park Cities Bank & Trust
Co., 481 F.2d 738, 740 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Estate of Swan, 441 F.2d 1082, 1087 (5th Cir.
1971).
148. The statute references section 6323(i)(1), which provides that: "An organization exercises due
diligence if it maintains reasonable routines for communicating significant information to the person
conducting the transaction and there is reasonable compliance with the routine. Due diligence does not
require an individual acting for the organization to communicate information unless such
communication is part of his regular duties or unless he has reason to know of the transaction and that
the transaction would be materially affected by the information." I.R.C. § 6323(i) (2000).
149. United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Circle, 652 F.2d 882, 889 (9th Cir. 1981).
150. United States v. Intercontinental lndustr., 635 F.2d 1215, 1218-19 (6th Cir. 1980); Fidelity
Bank, N.A. v. United States, 616 F.2d 1181, 1184-85 (10th Cir. 1980).
151. Wemer v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 558, 563 (D. Conn. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 1381 (2d Cir.
1975).
152. See Jersey Shore State Bank v. United States, 479 U.S. 442, 446 (1987) ("Section 3505 does
not declare that a lender is 'liable for the unpaid tax.' Instead, the section imposes liability on the
lender for all or part of 'a sum equal to the taxes."').
153. Id. at 446-47 (holding that because the 3505 liability was not a tax but rather a judgment for a
sum certain based on the tax, the IRS was not required to follow all of the notice provisions set out in
the Internal Revenue Code for collection of taxes). Specifically, I.R.C. § 6303, requiring notice and
demand prior to collection, did not apply to this situation.
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Example 1: ABC Inc. experiences financial difficulty during
2007 and XYZ Bank becomes increasingly involved in its
finances. It looks like ABC might get a contract that will pull it
out of the tailspin but it is totally out of gas pending the award of
that contact. It must keep the business going, however, to
remain competitive. During the first quarter of 2008 XYZ Bank
directly pays the payroll of ABC. Neither the bank nor the
company pays the withholding taxes of $25 over to the IRS.
ABC dissolves without making any payments on the
employment tax liability for the first quarter of 2008. The IRS
cannot pursue Bob, Mary and John because XYZ bank had
assumed financial control of ABC making Bob, Mary and John
either not responsible or not willful or both. The IRS pursues
XYZ pursuant to 3505(a) and obtains a judgment for $25 for the
full amount of the unpaid withholding taxes plus interest from
April 30, 2008, the due date of the employment tax return.
Example 2: ABC Inc. experiences financial difficulty in 2007
and XYZ Bank becomes increasingly involved as in Example 1.
During the first quarter of 2008 XYZ lends to ABC $80 so that
ABC can pay net payroll. XYZ knows the finances of ABC and
knows that ABC does not have sufficient funds to pay over the
withholding taxes. ABC dissolves without making any payment
on the employment tax liability for the first quarter of 2008. The
withholding tax obligation of ABC for the first quarter of 2008 is
$25. Again, the IRS would probably fail if it pursued a 6672
liability against Bob, Mary or John. The IRS pursues XYZ
pursuant to 3505(b) and obtains a judgment for $20 equal to 25
percent of the net payroll lending. The IRS cannot obtain
interest on this amount because it is limited to a 25 percent
recovery. 154

One case that highlights the differences between 6672 and 3505 and
explores the reach of the term "responsible person" in 6672 is Pacific
National Insurance, Co., v. United States.1 55 Pacific National, a surety,
loaned money to Central States Construction and Equipment Company
(Central) from May to September, 1955. This time period predated the
enactment of 3505 even though the 9th Circuit's opinion followed the
passage. Because of the period in issue, the IRS had to argue for the
assessment against Pacific National under 6672.
Naturally, Pacific
National argued that 3505 applied to its circumstances, albeit not literally
since it did not exist in 1955, and 6672 did not reach the situation presented
by this case.
154. See I.R.C. § 3505, supra note 137.
155. Pacific Nat. Ins. Co. v. U.S., 422 F.2d 26, 27, 30-33 (9th Cir. 1970).
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The court examined the legislative history and found little aid in
determining the scope of persons who were included. It determined that
Pacific National met the language of responsible person set forth in 6672
and sustained the decision of the District court holding Pacific National
liable for taxes under 6672. The case points out that 3505 and 6672
overlap. In fact, the government recommends looking to hold parties liable
under both provisions when possible.1 56 The result in Pacific National,
displaying the overlap between 3505 and 6672 on collected employment
taxes, points out the possibility that the government could obtain interest
from a responsible party back to the due date of the return by pursuing one
statute, 3505, while a parallel result remains unavailable if it pursues the
responsible officer under 6672.157
Did Congress intend to provide interest on collected taxes back to the
due date of the return only for that narrow class of collected taxes
represented by "net lenders" of wages? Does this class of responsible
officers have some special responsibility not borne by all others who
convert funds held in trust to some other purpose? Since 3505 updates
6672 and closes a narrow loophole on one aspect, could Congress have
included interest in 3505 without realizing that interest back to the due date
of the return did not apply in other responsible officer situations? Answers
to these questions do not exist in the legislative history of 3505. One
possible answer, that Congress simply did not think about the lack of
symmetry on the interest issue between the two statutes imposing liability
on responsible persons, provides support for seeking symmetry now to
close the gap between the two statutes. While 3505 came into existence to
close one loophole in 6672, Congress inadvertently exposed a fundamental
flaw in 6672. The fixing of that flaw requires imposing interest on the
responsible officers back to the due date of the return.
c. The problems createdfor the IRS
The first problem that the failure to charge interest under 6672 creates
for the IRS is the loss of the time value of money. As the example with
ABC shows, the amount of interest that runs between the time the
employment tax return is due and an assessment occurs with respect to one
156. "Thus, in considering the application of section 3505, the possibility of also asserting the trust
fund recovery penalty against the lender or an employee of the lender should not be overlooked." I.R.S.
Litigation Guideline Mem. GL-14 (May 4, 1994).
157. See also Commonwealth Nat'l Bank of Dallas v. United States, 665 F.2d 743 (5th Cir. 1982);
Regan & Co. v. United States, 290 F. Supp. 470, 479 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) ("[C]ongress sought to plug the
loopholes against the limitless ingenuity of those whose metier it is to search for crevices between
mortise and tenon in the infinitely complex definition and imposition of obligations in the Revenue
Code.").
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or more responsible officers can be significant. When that example
multiples across a system, the lost revenue begins to mount. Of course, the
IRS will not collect all of the interest that runs on its 6672 assessments but
it certainly would collect some of the money were it allowed to charge
interest back to the due date of the return.
The second problem for the IRS concerns resources. Many of the
individuals identified by the IRS as responsible officers subject to the 6672
liability know that they satisfy the statutory tests for liability under 6672.
These individuals, who know they are liable, can agree to that liability at
the first moment the IRS revenue officer appears seeking to investigate the
liability; however, they have no incentive to do so. The minute they agree
to the liability, an assessment will occur and interest will start to run.
Consequently, the system provides an incentive for even the individuals
who know they owe to exhaust their administrative remedies.' 58 This
places a burden on IRS resources that might significantly diminish if liable
individuals lost their incentive to delay.
The third problem created for the IRS results from the approach that
most states have taken with respect to individuals liable for collected taxes
not paid by the corporation that had primary responsibility. The significant
majority of states have adopted an approach similar to the one suggested
for the federal government in this article. These states hit individual
responsible officers with the same liability, including interest and penalties,
that are due from the corporation. They do not build in a period of delay
for interest and penalties. Consequently, knowledgeable individuals faced
with responsible officer liability to both the state and the federal
government, which is often the case, will pay their money first to the states
to stop the running of further penalties and interest while they continue to
exhaust their administrative remedies with the IRS. This situation
obviously puts the federal government at a competitive disadvantage in
seeking to collect from these individuals.

158. "Section 6672 does not refer to any liability of a responsible person for interest on the
delinquent taxes. A responsible person has no liability for interest on the unpaid withholding taxes to
the extent that it accrues between the date that the employee's tax should have been paid and the date
the IRS assesses the tax against the responsible person. Hence, a potentially responsible person has
reason to pursue all goodfaith defenses through the administrativeprocess." JOHN W. SCHMEHL &
RICHARD L. Fox, Responsible Person and Lender Liabilityfor Trust Fund Taxes - §§ 6672 and 3505,
639-2d TAX MGMT. (BNA) A-45 (2000) (emphasis added); see also DAVID M. RICHARDSON, JEROME
BORiSON & STEVE JOHNSON, CIVIL TAX PROCEDURE 400 (LexisNexis 2d ed. 2008) (2005). "An
important advantage to protesting the penalty before it is assessed is that doing so stays the assessment
of the penalty; consequently, interest does not begin to accrue." DAVID M. RICHARDSON, JEROME
BORISON & STEVE JOHNSON, CIVIL TAX PROCEDURE TEACHER'S MANUAL 284 (LexisNexis 2007)

(emphasis added). As seen below in the section discussing state laws on this issue, the administration
of this issue by the IRS will also prove more difficult in most states if the taxpayer or the taxpayer's
representative is well informed since the first payments will go to the state to stop the running of
interest and penalties there rather than to the IRS.
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All states with the exception of Wyoming have responsible officer
statutes that work with many similarities to section 6672. Most state
statutes draw directly from 6672 and, even if indirectly, certainly draw
from the same policy framework that drove the creation of 6672. Despite
their similar origins, the overwhelming majority of states have specifically
written into their responsible officer statutes or have judicially interpreted
their statutes in such a manner that their responsible officers are charged
interest from the due date of the underlying return (and penalties as well).
The manner in which the states have chosen to treat interest with respect to
individuals responsible for paying over collected taxes supports the
recommendation of this article.
While not controlling, viewing the manner in which states treat their
delinquent trust fund obligations vis a vis responsible officers provides
some insight from which the federal government can draw. As discussed
previously, IRC 6672 covers a variety of taxes.1 59 Employment taxes offer
the best known example of trust fund taxes in the federal system under IRC
6672 but the excise tax on telephone service which is collected by the
phone company on behalf of the federal government actually touches more
people. 60 Because the number of telephone companies is relatively small
and they typically do not have financial difficulties at the same rate as
"regular" businesses, this particular trust fund tax has received little
attention. The excise tax on telephone service, like the one on airplane
tickets161 and motor fuel, 162 behaves much like a sales or use tax common

in state taxing schemes. 63 So, in looking at states for comparative
purposes, both state withholding and sales tax provisions must be analyzed.
Because some states have no income tax' 64 and some states have no
159. See The Private Tax Collector,supranote 5.
160. I.R.C. § 4251. In 2006, total collections for the telephone excise tax equaled 4.6 million
dollars. I.R.S. SOI Bulletin Historical Table 20, Federal Excise Taxes Reported to or Collected by the
Internal Revenue Service, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau, and Customs Service, by Type
of Excise Tax.
161. l.R.C. §4261.
162. I.R.C. § 4081.
163. These three federal excise taxes operate to charge the consumer of the item (telephone service,
plane tickets or motor fuel) with a federal tax. The tax is collected by the provider of the service or
item purchased. The tax is held in trust by the provider for the federal government. Similarly, a state
sales tax imposes a liability on a purchaser of goods or other taxable items. The purchaser pays the tax
at the time of the purchase of the goods. The vendor receives the payment for the tax and holds that
payment in trust for the state which requires payment to it at certain intervals. One major difference
between the federal excise taxes and the state sales taxes is the breadth of business impacted by these
taxes. The federal excise taxes fall upon a relatively small number of business entities in very specific
businesses. The state sales taxes fall upon almost every retailer and the state use taxes fall upon many
other types of business providing a service. The numbers of the businesses being charged with
preservation of trust funds by the states makes its scope much more like the federal withholding taxes
and gives rise to a larger body of law concerning the failure to pay over sales taxes than exists with the
failure to pay over federal excise taxes.
164. E.g., Texas, Washington, Florida, Alaska, South Dakota, Nevada, and Wyoming. Also, New
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sales tax,' 65 there exists at times only one type of tax for comparison within
a specific state. Surprisingly, some states with both sales and income taxes
treat failures with respect to the payment of each of these taxes differently
when imposing the liabilities on individuals responsible for the trust fund
taxes. 66 Those differences merit further exploration
because within those
167
states exists two models for trust fund treatment.
The vast majority of states with trust fund tax regimes 68 choose to
impose upon the individual trustees (responsible officers) the precise
liability imposed upon the entity that failed to meet its trust fund
obligation.
Stated another way, these states have adopted, with respect
to interest, the same result advocated herein. These states also uniformly
impose penalties on unpaid trust fund taxes against the responsible officers
going back to the due date of the entity's return. 170 The combination of
imposing the penalty and interest due from the entity against the
responsible persons creates a significant additional liability against these
individuals compared to the liability imposed using the current federal
regime under IRC 6672.71 This additional liability for interest and penalt,
charged to the responsible officer could, if collected, reduce the tax gap;
Hampshire and Tennessee limit income taxation to interest and dividends. See infra, Appendix A.
165. E.g., Oregon, Alaska, Delaware, and New Hampshire. See infra, Appendix A.
166. E.g., Idaho, New York and West Virginia; possibly also South Carolina. See infra, Appendix A.
167. See discussion supra p. 138.
168. All states except Wyoming have some form of trust fund regime imposing personal liability on
person who fail to pay over to the state the taxes collected on its behalf.
169. See infra, Appendix A.
170. Id.
171. This is best illustrated through an example. Suppose that John Smith is the responsible officer
of Acme, Inc. a Pennsylvania corporation which failed to pay over the income taxes it withheld for the
first quarter of 2005 in the amount of $50,000. If we assume that the IRS takes 12 months after the due
date of the Form 941 on April 30, 2005, to initiate its trust fund recovery investigation and further
assume that John Smith avails himself of the full range of administrative remedies prior to assessment
while responding to the IRS at a very deliberate speed, it may be two years (April 30, 2007) after the
due date of the return before the IRS assesses the trust fund recovery penalty against him. Assuming
John failed to pay over collected taxes to Pennsylvania of the same amount for the same period, on
April 30, 2007, John Smith will owe the IRS $50,000 and on that same date he will owe the
Pennsylvania $61,000 consisting of $50,000 in trust fund taxes, $5,000 in interest and $6,000 in
penalties. Moving forward from April 30, 2007, John will owe interest and failure to pay penalties on
both the federal and state liabilities; however, the interest will be on the higher amount of the
Pennsylvania liability causing him to accrue even more interest (and penalty) expenses compared with
his federal tax liability. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-617, TAx COMPLIANCE:
BUSINESSES OWE BILLIONS IN FEDERAL PAYROLL TAXES, 32-33 (2008) (stating that "from the time
the tax debt was assessed against the business, IRS took over two years, on average, to assess [a 6672
liability] against the business owners/officers").
172. This is money that the federal government chooses not to seek even though the parallel state
statute seeks it for the most states. The fact that most states are seeking to pick up this money does not
compel the result that the federal government should do likewise; however, in a time of looking about
for tax gap provisions, the practice of the overwhelming majority of the states on this issue should at
least provide some food for thought for those writing the federal statutes with an eye toward more
revenue. Another consideration for imposing the tax could be whether this class of individuals is one
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however, the stronger reason for imposing interest, as argued herein, is the
removal of the incentive to delay the assessment. 173
Some states explicitly provide for interest in the flush language of
their statutes creating responsibility. 174 Other states have reached the same
result by judicial decision. 175 States reaching the result by judicial decision
with the courts referencing the fact that the responsible officer liability176is
an alternative means of collecting the trust fund tax is yet another model.
Based upon that reason for the liability of the responsible officer, the courts
177
conclude the officer is liable for everything for which the entity is liable.
A minority of states treat interest in the same manner as the federal
government. 178
These states have adopted statutes imposing the
responsible officer liability that essentially mirror the language of I.R.C.
6672.79 In interpreting their statutes, these states follow the federal
deserving of a break on interest or whether it is perhaps a class most deserving of making the
government whole on the time value of the revenue lost through their actions.
173. This also poses room for thought when comparing the state and federal provisions. If most
states impose interest from the due date of the entity return and the federal government imposes interest
only upon assessment of the responsible officer liability, what rational taxpayer would pay the federal
government first? In addition to the general incentive provided by I.R.C. 6672 to delay the assessment,
the juxtaposition of the state and federal statutes causes the responsible officer aware of the manner in
which the two statutes operate to use his first funds to pay down the state liability and stop the running
of interest. By the time the federal government comes into the mix, the available funds from the
responsible officer, which are generally not great to begin with, are further depleted, leaving the federal
government to scramble harder to collect its trust fund liabilities once they are finally assessed.
174. Alaska, California, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Washington D.C., Wisconsin. See infra, Appendix A.
175. Alabama, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio,
Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia. See infra, Appendix A.
176. Garland v. Director of Revenue, 961 S.W. 2d 824 (Mo. 1998).
177. Id.
178. Three states do not charge interest back to the due date of the corporate return and follow the
Federal model:
Arizona - ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-5028 (2006) (sales tax); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 43-435 (2006) (withholding tax); Arizona Dep't of Revenue v. Action Marine,
181 P.3d 188 (Ariz. 2008); Telephone Interview with Renee Jordan-Essig, Arizona
Department of Revenue, in Phoenix, Arizona (September 30, 2008); In re Inselman,
334 BR. 267 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2005);
Arkansas - ARK. CODE ANN. § 26-18-501 (1997); E-mail from John Theis, Assistant
Revenue Commissioner, Arkansas Department of Finance and Administration to T.
Keith Fogg, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law
(Aug. 15, 2008, 5:18 EST);
Delaware - DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 535(e) (1997) (withholding): (no sales tax in
Delaware); E-mail from Randy R. Weller, Manager Bankruptcy/Decedents, Delaware
Division of Revenue, to T. Keith Fogg, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Villanova
University School of Law (Mar. 10, 2008, 8:32:50 EST);
Utah - UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-1-302 (2007) (withholding and sales); Telephone
Interview with Gale Francis, Assistant Attorney General, Utah Attorney General's
Office, in Salt Lake City, Utah, Utah (March 14, 2008).
179. Id.
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interpretation and do not impose
liability until the assessment against the
180
responsible officer occurs.
A still smaller minority of states chooses to impose a larger liability
against the individuals liable for the trust fund liability than simply the
amount of the unpaid trust fund taxes.' 8' These states impose the liability
by means of a penalty. In Colorado the trust fund penalty is 150 percent of
the collected tax. 182 In Florida the trust fund penalty is 200 percent of the
collected tax.183 Penalties at these levels cause the responsible officer to
have a liability that reflects something close to the liability imposed by
those states hitting the taxpayer with the interest and penalty imposed on
the entity. By adopting a scheme that imposes a penalty for late payment
of collected taxes rather than one which simply seeks to collect the unpaid
tax, plus interest,
these states are at a disadvantage in bankruptcy
184
proceedings.
The state provisions for treating interest on the liability for collected
taxes imposed upon responsible officers provide an interesting window
from which to view the federal statutes. Most states impose liability upon
individuals because they build on the federal model. Yet, almost all states
go past the federal model to cause their statutes to work in a manner that,
with respect to interest, is philosophically consistent with the underlying
reason for the statute.1 85 The most interesting states are the states that "split
the baby." 186 These states charge responsible officers with interest back to
the due date of the entity's liability for sales taxes but charge interest only
from the assessment date of the responsible officer's liability for unpaid
withholding taxes. This division in approach, adopted by a small but
180. Id.
181. Two states do not charge interest back to the due date of the corporate return; however, they
charge the responsible officer with a "penalty" equal to 150 percent or 200 percent of the unpaid trust
fund taxes:
Colorado - COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-21-116.5 (West 2007) (sales and
withholding) (150 percent); and
Florida - FLA. STAT. ANN. § 213.29 (West 2005) (sales); (Florida does not have an
income tax).
182. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-21-116.5 (West 2007).
183. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 213.29 (West 2005).
184. The scheme used by Florida and Colorado appears to transform the liability from a collected
tax which would have priority under B.C. 507(a)(8)(C) to a general unsecured claim for a penalty.
185. Although not a part of this survey, liability for paying over collected taxes exists at the local
level as well. One locality imposing liability for failure to pay over withholding taxes is Columbus,
Ohio. Columbus charges the responsible officer with interest and penalty due from the entity that
incurred the tax. "The officer or the employee having control or supervision of or charged with the
responsibility of filing the report and making payment is personally liable for failure to file the report or
pay the tax due as required by this section. The dissolution of a corporation does not discharge an
officer's or employee's liability for a prior failure of the corporation to file returns or pay tax due."
Columbus v. Mid-Ohio Canopies, No. 95APG06-685, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4964 (Ohio Ct. App.
1995) (unpublished opinion).
186. Idaho, New York, West Virginia and South Carolina. See infra, Appendix A.
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diverse set of states, suggests a statutory scheme built upon placement
rather than consistent philosophy similar to the federal model. These states
all have different language in different sections of their codes for dealing
with persons responsible for collecting sales taxes versus persons
responsible for withholding employment taxes. In both circumstances the
money is to be collected and held by the employer for the state yet the code
sections, adopted at different times for the different specific purposes, fail
to take into account the essentially identical trust fund situation created in
each situation.
The fact that the overwhelming majority of states choose to impose
interest on responsible officers from the due date of the return of the entity
suggests that the states see the direct link between the liability of the
responsible officers and the liability of the entity. The state statutes
reaching this result contain diverse language. The position adopted by a
majority of the states has happened without the apparent benefit of any
model other than 6672 itself. The laws adopted by the majority of the
states represent a significant expression of how the derivative liability
imposed upon responsible officers should be structured with respect to
interest and validates the legal reasons expressed herein for modifying the
federal statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
"Employment taxes represent the largest portion of total tax dollars
collected by the IRS. In Fiscal Year 2007, for example, of the $2.7 trillion
in taxes collected by the IRS, $1.7 trillion was payroll taxes."' 187 With this
amount of money at stake, the importance of ensuring that third parties turn
over the money collected for the federal government has critical budget
implications.
Section 6672 serves the current system for insuring
collection from these third parties by imposing personal liability on the
individual responsible for failing to pay over the taxes collected from third
parties. As presently structured 6672 fails to fully carry out its purpose as a
collection device to insure payment of these collected taxes. Fixing 6672
to impose interest on responsible officers back to the due date of the
corporate return would align the operation of the statute with its purpose
and would foster higher compliance with this provision that assists in
collecting taxes in the most important segment of the federal tax system.

187. Linda Stiff, IRS Deputy Commissioner Services and Enforcement's, written testimony at the
Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations on the
Collection of Federal Employment Taxes, 2008 ARD 147-5 (CCH) (July 30, 2008).
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Appendix A - States Imposing Interest on Responsible Officers From
Due Date of Return
Alabama - ALA. CODE §§ 40-29-72, 73 (1998); McPhillips v. State,
No. P-04-377, 2 (Ala. Dept. of Revenue April 5, 2006) (IA Checkpoint,
Ala. Case Law) (failing to pay sales tax is willful if responsible person paid
other creditors instead); Campbell v. State, No. P-04-359, 2005 Ala. Tax
LEXIS 81, *4-5 (Ala. Dep't. of Revenue Nov. 10, 2005) (concluding that a
person is responsible for unpaid withholding taxes even if other individuals
are also responsible); State v. King, No. CV 91-B-2121-S, 1995 WL
423171, *3, *8 (N.D. Ala. 1995) (comparing Alabama law with I.R.C.
section 6672 )
Alaska - ALASKA STAT. § 23.20.240 (2006) (explaining collection of
delinquent contributions).; Breck v. State, 862 P.2d 854, 856 n.1 (Alaska
1993) (holding that interest is due for the period of delinquency)
California - CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 6829 (West 1998) (sales
tax); CAL. UNEMP. INS. CODE § 1735 (West 1986) (withholding tax); State
v. Wirick, 112 Cal. Rptr. 2d 919, 924 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (arguing that an
officer charged with causing the corporation to pay sales tax is liable)
Connecticut - CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 12-414a (West 2000)
(sales); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 12-736 (West 2000) (withholding). The
sales tax statute is clear that interest applies back to corporate due date on
responsible officer. The withholding tax statute mirrors 6672 and is
unclear
Georgia - GA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-52 (Supp. 2007) (withholding).;
GA. CODE ANN. § 34-8-167 (2004) (delinquent contributions); E-mail from
Warren R. Calvert, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Georgia Department
of Law, to T. Keith Fogg, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, Villanova
University School of Law (Mar. 18, 2008, 18:13:54 EST) (on file with
author)
Hawaii - HAW. REV. STAT. § 235-64(b) (Supp. 2007) (explaining
employer liability for withholding taxes held in trust)
Idaho - IDAHO CODE ANN. § 63-3078 (2007) (withholding); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 63-3627 (2007) (sales); Idaho State Tax Commission Ruling,
No. 19641, 2007 WL 2297072, *1 (Idaho Tax. Comm. April 3, 2007)
(holding that the taxpayer is responsible for penalty and interest relating to
failure to pay tax); Idaho State Tax Commission Ruling, No. 17949, 17950,
2004 WL 5215791, *1 (Idaho Id. St. Tax. Comm. Oct. 7, 2004) (holding
that taxpayer is responsible for penalties and interest for failing to pay
withholding and sales tax)
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Illinois - 35 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 735/3-7 (West 2006) (all trust
fund taxes)
Indiana - IND. CODE. § 6-3-4-8(g) (West 2006) (withholding); IND.
CODE § 6-2.5-2-1(b) (West 2006) (explaining tax on retail sales); IND.
CODE ANN. § 6-2.5-9-3 (West 2006) (sales); Russell v. Indiana Dep't. of
State Revenue, No. 49T10-0103-SC-31, 2001 Ind. Tax Lexis 68, *8-9 (Ind.
T.C. Dec. 6, 2001) (holding that the statute dealing with liability does not
allow a waiver of imposed interest)
Iowa - IOWA CODE ANN. § 422.16.4, 10 (West Supp. 2008)
(explaining penalties for failure to withhold or pay tax); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 422.4.19 (West 2006) (defining "withholding agent."); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 421.26 (West Supp. 2008) (explaining personal liability for tax due)
Kansas - KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-3643 (Supp. 2007) (explaining
personal liability for individuals responsible for collection of sales or
compensating taxes); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 79-2971 (Supp. 2007)
(explaining responsibility for collection of certain excise taxes); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 79-32,107(e) (Supp. 2007) (explaining penalties and interest
for failing to collect, account for, and pay tax); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 7932,100(b), (c) (Supp. 2007)
Kentucky - KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 141.340(2) (LexisNexis Supp.
2007) (withholding); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 139.185 (LexisNexis 2007)
(Sales); Koppel v. Revenue Cabinet, Commonwealth of Kentucky, 777
S.W.2d 938 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989); Nienaber v. Revenue Cabinet,
Commonwealth of Kentucky, No. K92-R-71, 1996 Ky. Tax LEXIS 379
(Bd. Tax App. March 13, 1996)
Louisiana - LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47:1561.1 (2006) (withholding
and sales)
Maine - ME. REV. STAT. ANN. Tit. 36, § 177.1 (Supp. 2007)
(withholding and sales); Prescott v. State Assessor, 721 A.2d 169 (Me.
1998)
Maryland - MD. CODE ANN., [Tax-General] § 10-906(d)
(LexisNexis 2004) (withholding); MD. CODE ANN., § 11-601(d)
(LexisNexis 2004) (sales); Nissenbaum v. Comptroller of the Treasury, No.
3374, 1991 WL 322992 (Md. Tax 1991); Fox v. Comptroller of Treasury,
728 A.2d 776 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999), cert. denied, 735 A.2d 1106 (Md.
1999) (sales)
Massachusetts - MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 62B, § 5 (West Supp.
2008) (withholding); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 62C, § 31A (West Supp.
2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS Ann. ch. 64H, § 16 (West Supp. 2008) (Sales);
Berenson v. Comm'r, 604 N.E.2d 704 (Mass. 1992) (sales); Hazard v.
Comm'r of Revenue, No. C261103, 2006 WL 724543 (Mass. App. Tax.
Bd. 2006) (withholding)
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Michigan - MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 205.27a(5)
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 205.65 (West 2007) (sales and
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(West 2007);
withholding);
Jamian v. Department of Treasury, No. 256522, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS
2601 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 10, 2005); Dickow v. Department of Treasury,
No. 0329530, 2007 Mich. Tax LEXIS 38 (Mich. Tax Tribunal Nov. 27,
2007)
Minnesota - MINN. STAT. ANN. § 270C.56 (West 2007); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 290.92 subdiv. 1(4) (West 2007) (withholding); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 297A.61, subdiv. 2 (West 2007) (sales)
Mississippi - MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-7-307 (West 2006)
(withholding)
Missouri - (The failure to file the sales or withholding tax return is a
prerequisite to trigger the imposition of tax against the responsible officer;
however, if triggered, interest is charged back to the due date of the entity's
return); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 143.241.2 (West 2006) (withholding); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 144.157.1 (West 2006) (Sales); Jones v. Director of
Revenue, 981 S.W.2d 571 (Mo.1998); see also Garland v. Director of
Revenue, 961 S.W. 2d 824 (Mo. 1998)
Montana - MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-68-811 (2007) (sales); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 15-30-203 (2007)
Nebraska - NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-1783.01 (2003); Neb. Dep't. of
Revenue, 4-787-1989 Rev. 10-2007, Statutory Responsibilities for
Collecting, Reporting, and Remitting Nebraska Taxes (2007)
Nevada - NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 360.297 (LexisNexis 2007)
(Sales)
New Hampshire - N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-A:7 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78-A:20 (LexisNexis 2001)
New Jersey - N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54A:9-6(f), (g), (1) (West Supp.
2008) (withholding); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54:32B-14 (West Supp. 2008);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 54-32B-2(w) (West Supp. 2008) (sales); Skaperdas v.
Director, Division of Taxation, 14 N.J. Tax 103 (1994), aff'd, 685 A.2d 18
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (sales). It is possible that New Jersey
follows New York and is split on income taxes where interest does not
accrue.
New Mexico - N.M. STAT. ANN. § 7-3-5 (LexisNexis 2004)
(withholding); In re Baker, No. 2001-30, 2001 WL 35723190 (N.M. Tax.
Rev. Dept. Nov. 1, 2001)
New York - N.Y. [Tax] LAW § 1133 (McKinney 2008) (sales);
Lorenz v. Dep't of Taxation, 623 N.Y.S.2d 455 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)
(sales); N.Y. [Tax] LAW § 685(g) (McKinney Supp. 2008); Yellin v. N.Y.
Tax Commission, 81 A.D.2d 196 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981). As mentioned
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above, New York imposes interest back to the due date of the entity return
for unpaid sales taxes but not for unpaid withholding taxes.
North Carolina - N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 105-253 (West 2007)
(withholding and sales); In re Jonas, 318 S.E.2d 869 (N.C. App. 1984); In
re Proposed Assessments, No. 2000-70, 2000 N.C. Tax LEXIS 23 (N.C.
Dept. Rev. Oct. 10, 2000); In re Proposed Assessments, No. 2004-45, 2004
N.C. Tax LEXIS 28 (N.C. Dept. Rev. June 25, 2004); N.C. Dep't of
Revenue, Individual Income Tax Gift Tax Estate Tax Rules and Bulletins
Taxable Years 2007 and 2008 (2008)
North Dakota - N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-38-60.1 (2000)
(withholding); N.D. CENT. CODE 57-39.2-18.1 (2000) (sales)
Ohio - OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5747.07 (LexisNexis 2005)
(withholding); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5739.33 (LexisNexis 2005)
(sales); Soltesiz v. Tracy, Tax Comm'r, 663 N.E.2d 1273 (Ohio 1996)
Oklahoma - OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2385.3(E) (West Supp.
2008) (withholding); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 2385.6(A) (West Supp.
2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 68, § 1361(A) (West 2008) (sales);
Oklahoma Tax Commission Decision, 2005-08-16-15, 2005 Okla. Tax
LEXIS 15 (Okla. Tax Comm. Aug. 16, 2005)
Oregon - OR. REV. STAT. § 316.207(3) (2007) (withholding); see
also OR. REV. STAT. § 316.162(3)(b) (2007); (no sales tax in Oregon)
Pennsylvania - 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7320 (West 2000)
(withholding); 72 PA. STAT. ANN. § 7201(e) (West Supp. 2008) (sales); In
re Hartman, 375 B.R. 740 (W.D. Pa. 2007)
Rhode Island - R.I. GEN. LAWS § 44-30-76, 85 (2005) (withholding);
In re Payroll Tax, No. 98-14, 1998 R.I. Tax LEXIS 12 (R.I. Div. of Tax.
Aug. 20, 1998); In re Payroll Tax, No. 93-22, 1993 R.I. Tax LEXIS 24
(R.I. Div. of Tax. July 14, 1993); In re Withholding Tax, No. 94-18, 1994
R.I. Tax LEXIS 17 (R.I. Div. of Tax. June 2, 1994); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4419-35 (2005)
South Carolina - S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-8-2010 (2000)
(withholding); S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-54-195 (Supp. 2007) (sales)
South Dakota - S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 10-45-55 (2004); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 10-59-1, 6 (2004, Supp. 2008)
Tennessee - TENN. CODE ANN. § 67-1-1443(a) (2006) (sales) (No
state income tax)
Texas - TEX. [Tax] CODE ANN. § 111.016 (Vernon 2008) (sales);
Dixon v. State, 808 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. App. 1991); (no state income tax)
Vermont - VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5844 (2007) (withholding); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 9703 (Supp. 2007) (sales); Rock v. Dep't of Taxes,
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742 A.2d 1211 (Vt. 1999). Rock says withholding and sales tax provisions
are treated the same even though they have slight variation. The
withholding statute is silent on interest while the sales tax statute is explicit.
Virginia - VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-1813 (2004) (withholding and
sales); In re Individual Income Tax, No. 05-132, 2005 Va. Tax LEXIS 159
(Va. Dept. of Tax. Aug. 10, 2005)
Washington - WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 82.32.145 (West 2000)
(Sales); In re Petition for Correction of Trust Fund Accountability, No. 050066, 24 Wash. Tax. Dec. 454 (Wash. Dept. of Revenue Appeals Div. Mar.
30, 2005); (Washington has no income tax)
Washington, D.C. - D.C. CODE ANN. 47-4491 (withholding and
sales); Michael v. District of Columbia, No. 5490-93 (D.C. Super. Ct. Tax
Div. Dec. 30, 1997)
West Virginia - W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11-15-17 (LexisNexis 2005)
(Sales); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 11-10-19 (LexisNexis 2003) (withholding);
Frymier-Halloran v. Paige, 458 S.E.2d 780 (W.Va. 1995); In re Bowen,
116 B.R. 477 (S.D. W. Va. 1990); In re Audia, Nos. 93-384 CS, 93-385
WS, 1994 W. Va. Tax LEXIS 81 (W. Va. Dept. Tax and Revenue May 27,
July 7, 1994). West Virginia imposes interest back to the due date of the
return for sales taxes but not for income taxes.
Wisconsin - WIs. STAT. ANN. § 71-83(1)(b) (West 2004)
(withholding); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 77.60(9) (West 2004) (sales); Omegbu
v. Wisconsin Dept. of Rev., No. 97-W-342, 1999 Wisc. Tax LEXIS 46
(Tax App. Comm. Oct. 14,1999)
Appendix B - International Law Treatment of Responsible Officers
The concept of using businesses to collect taxes for the government
exists in other countries. A brief survey of English speaking countries
suggests that even more support exists for the concept of charging interest
back to the due date of the corporate return relating to the collected tax.
While these countries all have systems that differ from the responsible
officer system used in the United States, their systems also have much in
common with the United States. The concept of holding individual
corporate officers responsible for the failure to pay over taxes collected by
a corporation for the government is one which the countries share even if
their systems of affecting the liability differ.
Canada
Canada has a provision similar to that of the United States for
withholding income taxes.
Persons paying salary, wages or other
remuneration must withhold taxes and remit them to the Receiver General
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at the time prescribed by regulation. 188 The amounts withheld pursuant to
this provision are held "in trust for Her Majesty and for payment to Her
' 89
Majesty in the manner and at the time provided under this Act.'
Corporate directors of the entity that fails to withhold or remit such taxes
are jointly and severally liable to pay that amount plus any interest and
penalties relating to it.190 The Soper case discusses the objective and
subjective tests applied with respect to 9 any director to determine if the
director meets the exception for liability.' '
In addition to the liability for the unpaid withholding taxes, the
director may be liable for a 10 percent or 20 percent penalty for a knowing
failure to remit the withheld taxes or gross negligence in the failure to
remit.1 92 The Canadian statute holding directors liable developed in the
1980s when Canada felt too many companies were failing to pay collected
employment taxes. 193 The current Canadian law makes clear that the
directors of a company that does not pay over withheld employment taxes
are personally liable for not only the94taxes but the penalties and interest as
well that are due from the company. 1
England
England requires an employer to withhold its mandated social security
contribution from wages. Corporate officers incur liability if the "failure
[to pay] appears to the [Inland Revenue] to be attributable to fraud or
neglect on the part of one or more individuals who, at the time of the fraud
or neglect, were officers of the body corporate. ' '
Unless only one
188. Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 153(1) (1985) (Can.).
189. Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 227(4) (1985) (Can.).
190. Income Tax Act, R.S.C., § 227.1(1) (1985) (Can.) ("Where a corporation has failed to deduct
or withhold an amount as required .. , has failed to remit such an amount or has failed to pay an
amount of tax for a taxation year as required . . . , the directors of the corporation at the time the
corporation was required to deduct, withhold, remit or pay the amount are jointly and severally, or
solidarily, liable, together with the corporation, to pay that amount and any interest or penalties relating
to it."). See Soper v. The Queen, [1997] 3 C.T.C. 242 (Can.) (discussion of legislative history of
227.1); and Veilleux v. The Queen, [2001] 3 C.T.C. 288 (Can.).
The Income Tax Act section 227.1(2) provides some limitations on this liability as does section
227.1(3), which states: "A director is not liable for a failure under subsection (1) where the director
exercised the degree of care, diligence and skill to prevent the failure that a reasonably prudent person
would have exercised in comparable circumstances." Income Tax Act, R.S.C. § 227.1(2), (3) (1985)
(Can.). See Barnett v. Minister of National Revenue, [1985] 2 C.T.C. 2336 (Can.) (sole shareholder
liable and unable to successfully interpose defense of delegation to comptroller.); Fraser v. Minister of
National Revenue, [1987] 1 C.T.C. 2311 (Can.) (director who was vice-President liable and unable to
successfully argue that another officer could more easily pay); Beutler v. Minister of National Revenue,
[1988] 1 C.T.C. 2414 (Can.) (holding the Director and President liable despite efforts to satisfy
arrearages).
191. Soper v. The Queen, [1997] 3 C.T.C. 242 (Can.).
192. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. § 227(9) (1985) (Can.).
193. Soper, 3 C.T.C. at 250 (Can.).
194. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. § 227.1(1) (1985) (Can.).
195. Social Security Administration Act, 1992, ch. 5, § 121C(l)(b) (Eng.).

HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL

Vol. 5:1

corporate officer exists, England apportions the liability among the officers
based on relative responsibility. 19 6 The amount of liability asserted against
the officers(s) includes interest and penalty amounts due from the
of the liability Inland
corporation.'
Interest then runs on the amount
98
Revenue specifies as due from the individual.
Australia
Corporate directors face personal liability for failure of the
corporation to withhold income taxes. 199 The directors also face personal
liability for failure of the corporation to timely pay the withheld taxes over
to the government.200 The liability for failure to collect and pay over can
equal the full amount of the taxes not paid. Interest on the unpaid liability
is subject to the discretion of the tribunal imposing the liability.01

196. Social Security Administration Act, 1992, ch. 5, § 121C(3)(b) (Eng.). England also imposes
personal liability for evasion of Value Added Tax (VAT) if dishonest conduct played a role in its non
payment. Id. at §§ 60-61. This personal liability also has a relative responsibility component. Id. at §
61(2).
197. Social Security Administration Act, 1992, ch. 5, § 121C(2)(b)(i)&(9) (Eng.).
198. Social Security Administration Act, 1992, ch. 5, § 121C(2)(b)(ii) (Eng.).
199. Income Tax Assessment Act, 1936, § 222AOB (Austl.).
200. Income Tax Assessment Act, 1936, § 222AOC (Austl.).
201. District Court Act, 1973, § 83A (Austl.).

